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THE PREVENTION OF TAX HAVENS VIA
INCOME TAX TREATIES
VINCENT P. BELOTSKY, JR.*
Benjamin Franklin opined that "nothing in this world can be said
to be certain, except death and taxes."' Yet, legal tax avoidance
has been regarded as desirable and respectable. As Judge Learned
Hand stated:
[A] transaction, otherwise within ... the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid.. .taxation.
Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low
as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase
one's taxes.'
Tax havens are used precisely for this end: to reduce tax liabili-
ties. The problem, however, is that not all uses of tax havens are
legal. Millions of dollars of income are illegally sheltered in tax
havens each year, posing a distinct hardship on the revenue-produc-
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1. C. DOGGART, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES 1981 (EIU SPECIAL REPORT No. 150)
1 (1981).
2. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934),
aff'd 293 U.S. 465 (1935)., Judge Hand also stated:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor, and
do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes
are enforced extractions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name
of morals is mere cant.
Quotation in R. KINSMAN, THE ROBERT KINSMAN GUIDE TO TAX HAVENS 1 (1981)
Similar views prevail in the United Kingdom: "No man in this country is under the small-
est obligation-moral or other-to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his prop-
erty as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible shovel into his stores."
Ayshire Motor Pullman Motor Serv. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, 14 T.C. 754, 763-64
(1920).
Tax havens are not openly used to further illegal purposes; there are bona fide opportuni-
ties for United States taxpayers to invest in offshore tax havens. In many instances, the tax
consequences of tax haven transactions reflect clear congressional intent to limit the scope of
the United States taxing jurisdiction. Additionally, courts have consistently recognized the
taxpayers' right to minimize their tax liability to the full extent that they are permitted by
law, including opportunities afforded by offshore tax havens.
Comment, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally Evading Income
Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 676-77 (1982).
1
Belotsky: The Prevention of Tax Havens Via Income Tax Treaties
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ing sources of many countries.$
In 1981, in the report, Tax Havens and Their Use by the United
States Taxpayers-An Overview Report,' the United States Gov-
ernment directly attacked the evasion of income taxes through tax
havens. In examining the legal and illegal uses of tax havens, the
Report concluded that the basis for the problem rests in the com-
plexity of tax laws, enforcement difficulties, limited information
gathering resources, the secrecy laws in tax haven jurisdictions and
the lack of effective tax treaties. Some of the solutions that have
attempted to solve the problem of the illegal use of tax havens have
included changes in the laws relating to tax havens, improved en-
forcement efforts, changes in the reporting of taxes, greater compli-
ance cooperation between taxing jurisdictions and changes in tax
treaty policies.
Despite these efforts, there still is evidence that the use of tax
havens as tax evasion devices is flourishing." In fact, as recently as
early 1986, the United States Commissioner of the Internal Reve-
nue Service met with various foreign leaders to discuss the
problem.6
The Article will atempt to show that the effective use of income
tax treaties might be a solution to.the problem of tax avoidance and
3. Tax havens take in $20 billion dollars a year in hidden United States money. Stark
Calls for Action Against Tax Havens, 28 TAX NOTES 1408 (1985).
4. R. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY THE UNITED STATES TAXPAY-
ERS-AN OVERVIEW, PUB. 1150 (Apr. 1981) [hereinafter REPORT]. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the Report, see Zagaris, The IRS Tax Haven Report Proposes Many Reforms, 16
TAXES INT'L, Feb. 1981, at 1.
5. A most recent example is the report of "offshore laundries" where tax haven ser-
vices exist and attempt to lure taxpayers to invest in various schemes, some legal and some
illegal. Such services even publish a daily tax haven tabloid. Kurtz, The Offshore Laundry:
IRS Putting Promoters Through Wringer, Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 5. Several tax
haven guidebooks have been published and are constantly updated. See E. CHAMBOST, USING
TAX HAVENS SUCCESSFULLY (T. Crowley trans. 1978); W. & D. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF
THE WORLD (1981); GRUNDY'S TAX HAVENS: A WORLD SURVEY (J. Walters 4th ed. 1983);
R. KINSMAN, supra note 2; M. LANGER, HOW TO USE FOREIGN TAX HAVENS (1975); B.
SPITZ, TAX HAVENS ENCYCLOPEDIA (1985); A. STARCHILD, TAX HAVENS, WHAT THEY ARE
AND WHAT THEY CAN DO FOR THE SHREWD INVESTOR (1979); Deloitte, Haskins and Sells,
INT'L TAX NEWS (June 1986).
The United States Internal Revenue Service is constantly attempting to pull the plug on
tax havens. See A Treaty That May Sink Havens, BUS. WK., Feb. 14, 1983, at 140, 142. See
also DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN 51 (Jan. 1984)
[hereinafter TAX HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN].
6. On January 27, 1986, Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., the United States Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service, met with tax leaders of France, Germany and the United King-
dom to address the issues of tax havens, tax treaty abuses and exchanges of tax information.
This "Group of Four" heads of taxing authorities was formed in 1970 to expand and further
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evasion through the use of tax havens. Particularly, it will deal with
the United States' perceptions of the problem and its uses of trea-
ties as a combative measure. In a sense, this Article will serve as a
recent survey of the use of tax havens and tax treaties. Its focus
will be a review of current treaties to determine if they have served
as an effective solution.
The Article will first set forth the specific proposals for and solu-
tions to the tax haven abuse problem, detailing how the effective
use of tax treaties can prevent tax avoidance and evasion through
tax havens. Background information on tax avoidance and evasion
and tax havens will then be presented. The importance of income
tax treaties and current treaty developments relating to tax havens
will be examined along with a cursory view of tax evasion through
"treaty shopping." This Article will then turn to a few collateral
perspectives: a brief survey of the use of the courts as a tax haven
prevention mechanism and an explanation of the tax haven problem
as it confronts other countries. The substance of this Article will
concentrate on the use of recent tax treaties as a prevention mecha-
nism for the tax haven problem focusing on the United States' tax
treaty policy.
INTRODUCTION
Tax havens have existed for some time but did not begin to pre-
sent themselves as a major loss of revenue problem for the United
States until 1970.1 In the early 1970's, attention focused on tax
havens, especially with regard to foreign manufacturing corpora-
tions which flourished using some of the then-existing tax havens
such as Ireland. The long and detailed congressional report com-
pleted in 1981 was the first major attempt by the United States to
deal with the problem. It was prepared over the course of about one
year and contains 235 pages. It evolved as a direct response to con-
gressional inquires and investigations.8 The goals of the Report
7. "International tax avoidance and evasion, including the use of tax havens to avoid
or evade United States taxes, have been of long-standing concern to the Congress and tax
administrators." REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. In 1921, Congress initially focused on the use
of foreign subsidiaries to milk United States parent corporations. In the 1930's, the concern
was individuals transferring assets to tax havens. Congressional actions on the abuses of
multi-national corporation began in 1962. The Bank Secrecy Act was passed in 1970, the
same year the Internal Revenue Service began investigating tax havens. Id.
8. Oversight Hearings into the Operation of the Internal Revenue Service (Operation
Tradewinds, Project Haven, and Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program: Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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were to find out what was going on in tax havens, quantitatively
and qualitatively, to inform decision-makers and to suggest needed
administrative, legislative and treaty changes." The Report un-
equivocally concluded that there existed a wide-spread and growing
use of tax havens by United States taxpayers, representing a seri-
ous tax compliance problem in the United States. 10
A series of administrative and legislative changes have occurred
since the Report was published." Although not a treaty develop-
ment per se, a significant change occurred in 1983 with the passage
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative which dealt with a series of crimi-
nal and tax concerns.' 2 This legislation can be regarded as a dis-
9.
The purpose of the study was to develop an overview of tax havens and the use of
tax havens by United States taxpayers. The study sought to determine the fre-
quency and nature of the tax haven transactions, . . . obtain a description of the
United States and foreign legal and regulatory environment in which tax haven
transactions are conducted, describe Internal Revenue Service and Justice Depart-
ment efforts to deal with tax haven related transactions, and to identify interagency
coordination problems.
REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
10. Id. at 5-10. See also Growing Use of Tax Havens Is Serious Problem, Says IRS,
151 J. ACCT. (Mar. 1981), at 22.
Even the Report's opponents admitted:
"There can be no disagreement with the Report's conclusions with regard to the need for
the IRS to deal aggressively and effectively with situations of tax evasion." Aland, The Trea-
sury Report of Tax Havens-A Response, 59 TAXES 993, 995 (1981).
Obviously, the primary reason for the existence of tax havens is the avoidance of taxes.
The Report has outlined some other major factors for the use of tax havens: "(1)
confidentiality; (2) freedom from currency controls; (3) freedom from banking controls, par-
ticularly the reserve requirements. [sic] (4) receipt of higher interest rates on bank deposits
and to borrow at lower interest rates." REPORT, supra note 4, at 23. In addition the report
noted that another consideration is anonymity. Id. See also M. LANGER, supra note 5, at 1-
10.
11. Gordon, The United States Government Report on Tax Havens: An Update, CA-
NADIAN TAX FOUND. 786, 789-95 (Ann. 1982). The legislative changes will be explored in
some detail infra section H of part II.
12. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. 2701-2706 (Supp. 1I 1985)). See also H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
IRS Commissioner Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., told a Senate Subcommittee on March
15 [1983] that Treasury is losing billions of dollars of revenue to tax evaders who
launder funds through offshore tax havens--especially in the Caribbean. Testifying
before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations, Egger
stated that "to a considerable degree the activities in these tax havens involve nar-
cotics traffickers and other elements of organized crime, illegal tax protestors, and
promoters of abusive tax shelters."
But the offshore tax havens are also attracting "seemingly law-abiding persons of
moderate means who are using offshore banking facilities and other offshore entities
as a means of tax evasion," said Egger. The Commissioner explained that the tax
havens include countries that have little or no tax on certain types of income and
that provide "a certain level of banking or commercial secrecy."
Senate Committee Examines Offshore Tax Havens, 18 TAX NOTES 1070 (1983). See Trea-
sury Reports on Use of Caribbean Tax Havens, 22 TAX NOTES 165 (1984). See also TAX
[Vol. 17
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tinct reflection of the United States treaty policies toward tax
havens." The changes in United States tax treaty policy, and ac-
tual treaty changes, will be explored in detail as the substance of
this Article.
I. PROPOSALS
No single action will solve the problem of tax evasion or avoid-
ance via tax havens. The United States' current efforts are a start.
More attention, however, must be directed toward the problem.
The use of tax treaties can be an excellent preventive mechanism
for tax evasion through tax havens.
Although tax treaties are an effective mechanism for curbing tax
haven abuses, the United States policy is not strict enough in re-
quiring stringent anti-treaty shopping measures. The concessions in
the form of exceptions to the much needed treaty with the Nether-
lands Antilles are examples. 14 The United States must specifically
require strict anti-treaty shopping provisions in all future treaties
and must also renegotiate existing treaties to provide for such
provisions.
Further, the United States must terminate or renegotiate to its
benefit and mutual interests tax treaties that exist with tax havens
themselves. This is particularly so with treaties that have resulted
from treaty networking. 5 The known abuses of these existing trea-
ties require their immediate termination. The United States must
hold strong to its anti-tax haven position through its negotiations
with tax havens."
There must also exist a method for examining current treaties for
their effectiveness.1 7 This is especially true in regard to exchange of
HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN. supra note 5, at 50.
13. See infra section H of part II.
14. See discussion on Netherlands Antilles infra subsection 3b of section B of part V.
15. See infra subsection 3 of section B of part V.
16. "The best approach to dealing with treaty problems is to handle them through the
negotiation process." REPORT, supra note 4, at 175.
17.
Despite the obvious abuse of the treaties, a large and growing network of treaties,
and an aggressive treaty negotiation program, existing treaties are not reviewed on
any systematic regular basis, and the United States has shown little inclination to
terminate them. Consequently, treaties which perhaps can be abused or which no
longer serve a legitimate economic purpose are still in effect. Further, the United
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information provisions.18 Use of these provisions is the critical in-
gredient to obtaining fiscal information which in turn can be used
to end tax evasion. Proper enforcement must also be sought if the
countries fail to comply with their exchange of information
agreements.
Additional legislation in the United States dealing directly with
tax havens is needed. The current tax reform legislation, however,
is of little value to the tax haven and tax evasion problems. Possi-
bly, tax haven operations could be affected by the proposed tax on
United States branches of foreign companies. 19 There are some,
however, who believe that the United States' most recent treaties
conflict with this proposal.
More use of the courts through litigation might also present a
solution to the tax haven problem. However, more attention and
emphasis must be directed to this alternative before its viability can
be established.
If no single action by one country will solve the problem, it is
unreasonable to expect that addressing the problem in one region
will deter the use of tax havens in other parts of the world.20 Tax
18. See infra subsection I of section A of part V.
19. Under current U.S. tax law, the effectively connected income of a U.S. branch of a
foreign corporation is subject to U.S. income tax, but there is no additional tax that would
compare to the withholding tax imposed on dividends paid by a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign
corporation on the branch's remittances to the home office. Instead, the U.S. imposes a with-
holding tax ("the second dividend tax") on a proportionate part of the dividends paid by the
foreign corporation if more than fifty percent of the corporation's gross income is effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business.
According to the report on details of the Administration tax proposals, the existing second
dividend tax "fails to equalize the tax treatment of branches and subsidiaries in many cases."
The proposal is that the second dividend tax, and a "second interest tax" analogous to the
dividend withholding tax paid by a foreign corporation to foreign persons, both be repealed.
They would be replaced by an additional tax on the profits of U.S. branches of foreign corpo-
rations and on interest on (1) debt issued by a foreign corporation to an affiliate which is
allocable to a U.S. branch of the corporation and (2) extensions of credit by a foreign bank
to a foreign corporation which is allocable to a U.S. branch of the corporation. Skilling,
International Parts of Reagan Tax Package Very Similar to Earlier Treasury Proposals, 12
TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., July 1985, at 3, 4. See also Stern, Tax Plan May Hinder U.S. Firms
Abroad, J. Com., June 3, 1985, at 3A, col. I
20.
The United States alone cannot deal with tax havens. The policy must be an inter-
national one by the countries that are not tax havens to isolate the abusive tax
havens. The United States should take the lead in encouraging tax havens to provide
information to enable other countries to enforce their laws. For example, the United
States could terminte tax treaties with abusive tax havens, increase the withholding
tax on United States source income paid to tax havens and take other steps to dis-
courage United States business from using tax havens. However, such steps taken
unilaterally would place United States business at a competitive disadvantage as
against businesses based in other OECD countries. Accordingly, a multilateral ap-
proach to deal with tax havens is needed.
[Vol. 17
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haven activities may just be shifted to another geographic area. An
international effort, such as a widespread multilateral treaty, might
be useful to deal with the tax haven problem. The only current
multilateral convention dealing specifically with tax evasion and
avoidance is limited to five Nordic countries, only a regional effort.
The European Economic Community has made some efforts in this
area and surely the OECD Model Convention is an international
approach. 1 The United States involvement in and encouragement
of an international treaty is needed.
A combination as well as a culmination of these actions are nec-
essary to effectively prevent tax haven abuse and eliminate interna-
tional tax evasion. The United States' tax haven treaty policy must
become firm.2 2 The work by the United States has been started;
aggressive efforts must continue.
II. TAX HAVENS
The very definition of a tax haven outlines its characteristics and
requirements. Tax havens are countries which have a low or zero
rate of tax on all or certain categories of income and which offer a
high level of banking or commercial secrecy.23 This definition may
even be somewhat philosophical.24 The history and types of tax
havens are important to their current existence as well as their op-
eration as will be examined. However, the role of tax havens in tax
avoidance or evasion situations must first be explained.
REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
21. See infra subsection 8 of section B of part IV.
22. See infra section C of part V.
23. Egger Discusses Tax Haven Problems Before House Subcommittee, 3 TAX TREA-
TIES (CCH) 9947 (Apr. 1983); Chapoton Explains U.S. Tax Haven Treaty Policy, id.
9946; REPORT, supra note 4, at 14; Browne, International Tax and Exchange Control Re-
quirements in OECD Countries, 11 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., July 1984, at 11, 12. See also
Irish, Tax Havens, 15 VANDERBILT J. TANSNAT'L L. 449, 452 (1982); A. STARCHILD, supra
note 5, at 21; B. SPITZ, supra note 5, at 1.
24. As Internal Revenue Commissioner Egger said, "I'm sure anyone familiar with the
subject 'knows one when he sees one,' regardless of the exact definition used." Egger Dis-
cusses Tax Haven Problems Before House Subcommittee, supra note 23, 9947. For a
comprehensive but somewhat outdated bibliography regarding tax havens, see F. CHIN, TAX
HAVENS: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, Public Administration Series: Bibliography P-520,
ISSN: 0193-970X, 1 (July 1980).
Following such reasoning, tax havens have been defined as sanctuaries and "[a] sanctuary
exists whenever activites elsewhere prohibited, or individuals elsewhere faced with punish-
ment, are provided immunity from harm or loss." R. BLUM, OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS,
TRUSTS, AND COMPANIES: THE BUSINESS OF CRIME IN THE EUROMARKET 1 (1984).
1987]
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A. Tax Avoidance v. Tax Evasion
The distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance is impor-
tant in defining the legal versus illegal uses of tax havens. It is also
important in understanding the problem of international tax avoid-
ance which is a catalyst of tax havens.
Tax evasion is a willful and deliberate violation of the law in
order to escape payment of a tax imposed on income by the taxing
jurisdiction. In the United States, this is a felony punishable by
fine or imprisonment. 6 Tax evasion can involve acts intended to
misrepresent or conceal facts in an effort to purposely escape lawful
tax liabililty.
27
Tax avoidance is ethical planning utlizing legal methods to avoid
unnecessary taxation. Tax avoidance has unfortunate connotations
as it usually implies tax evasion.2 8 The definitions can cause unclear
distinctions or "grey areas" and some believe the terms have never
been adequately explained. 9
The distinction becomes even more complicated with further defi-
nitions especially in the international arena. International tax
avoidance is the reduction of tax liability through the movement or
nonmovement of persons or funds across tax boundaries by legal
methods.30 International tax avoidance is not a recent phenome-
25. U.N. Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing
Countries, 3d Rep. at 69, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/166 (1972).
26. I.R.C. § 7201 (1982).
27. Comment, supra note 2, at 677.
28.
"The term tax avoidance itself has unfortunate connotations; it is considered as
referring to an attitude of unethical and, indeed, unlawful behavior, although it is
actually a neutral term. In the pejorative sense the term tax evasion should be used,
which indicates an action by which a taxpayer tries to escape his legal obligations
by fraudulent means. The confusion arises from the fact that sometimes taxes are
avoided-by the use of perfectly legal measures-against the purpose and spirit of
the law. Where this is the case, the taxpayer involved is abusing the law and he is
blamed for it, although, no penal measures can be taken against him."
REPORT, supra note 4, at 60 (quoting van Hoorn, Jr., The Uses and Abuses of Tax Havens,
TAX HAVENS AND MEASURES AGAINST TAX EVASION AND AVOIDANCE IN THE EEC (1974)).
29. The Report eschews a black and white distinction and establishes four categories
of tax conduct ranging from totally legal to fraud. REPORT, supra note 4, at 59-61. Identify-
ing the dividing line has occupied the attention of many. See TAX AVOIDANCE, TAX EVASION
(1982); van Hoorn, Jr., supra note 28, at 1.
30. ROTTERDOM INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE: A
STUDY BY THE ROTrERDOM INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL SERIES OF THE
ROTTERDOM INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES 29 (1979) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE]. The study analyzes the policies of six Western countries towards international
tax avoidance.
There are as many international tax avoidance practices as there are tax laws and
regulations. The extent and variety of those practices are still increasing with the
intensification of international economic relationships. There is an equally extensive
[Vol. 17
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non s' and its origins are deeply rooted .3 on the international spec-
trum, the problem is threefold. First, the distinction between tax
evasion and avoidance is often unclear because the laws vary from
country to country.
Illegal tax evasion in one jurisdiction may be permissible tax
avoidance in another. The characterization of a transaction as tax
evasion or tax avoidance is dependent on the local laws applicable
to the transaction. There is often considerable debate even within
a single jurisdiction as to whether a particular transaction consti-
tutes tax evasion or tax avoidance. s
Second, courts will not necessarily enforce foreign tax liabilities.
4
This is the nonrecognition principle subscribed to by many coun-
tries. Third, the problem is often in the tax treaties themselves. The
collection provisions in the income tax treaties are sometimes inef-
fective in curbing tax evasion." The treaties may also fail to distin-
guish between evasion and avoidance in providing for exchanges of
and varied body of tax laws designed to prevent international tax avoidance. One
major conclusion which can be drawn ... concerns imperfect, inconsistency, partic-
ularity, arbitrariness and even ineffective international tax law. This problem is seri-
ously aggravated by the secrecy surrounding and actual details of international tax
practice affecting each individual taxpayer. Most of the details are restricted to tax
officials and tax advisors. This limits the scope for a scientific treatment of the sub-
ject, which might otherwise make a larger contribution to more rational legislation.
Id. at 63.
31.
International tax avoidance is not new to the U.S. In 1721, the American colonies
shifted their trade to Latin America in order to avoid paying duties imposed by
England. The tax morality which developed from this avoidance of English duties
has been described as follows: "The fact that the colonists were constantly evading
the navigation acts, and made no pretense of paying the duties imposed by England
must have had a demoralizing effect, and taught them to evade duties imposed by
their own law makers ......
The prototype of the modern tax haven is Switzerland, which developed as a "ha-
ven" for capital (rather than as a "haven" from tax) for those fleeing political and
social upheavals in Russia, Germany, South America, Spain and the Balkans.
REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (footnotes omitted).
32. See Hearings on Conventions on Double Taxation Before Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 71 (1951); Eichel, Administrative Aspects of the
Prevention and Control of International Tax Evasion, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 25, 26 (1965).
"This trend will intensify as economic interdependence increases and taxpayers become
aware of the ability to evade legally a foreign tax liability by transgressing international
boundaries. Adherence to the nonrecognization rule, moreover, encourages such continued
tax evasion." Comment, The Nonrecognition of Foreign Tax Judgments: International Tax
Evasion, 1981 U. ILL. L. R. 241, 267.
33. Irish, supra note 23, at 506.
34. "[N]o country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another." Holman v. John-
son, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (1775). This issue, as well as many international tax issues,
requires defining foreign versus domestic taxpayers. For an excellent article on this subject,
see Tillinghast, A Matter of Definition: "Foreign" and "Domestic" Taxpayers, 2 INT'L TAX
& Bus. LAW 239 (1984).
35. Comment, supra note 32, at 241.
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information."0 The distinction between tax avoidance and evasion is
especially important because the particular laws governing the
transactions are unclear3 7 leading to the exchange of incomplete
data.
B. Characteristics and Requirements
The Internal Revenue Service has defined a tax haven to be a
country characterized by some of the following:38
(1) Tax rates which are lower than the tax rates imposed by coun-
tries whose residents use tax havens;
(2) Communication and bank secrecy laws which the jurisdiction
refuses to breach, even when faced with serious violations of the
laws of another country;
(3) Relative importance of banking in the country;
(4) Availability of modern communication facilities; "
(5) Lack of currency controls on nonresidents with respect to for-
eign currency;
(6) In most cases, aggressive self-promotion as a tax haven; and,
(7) In certain cases, a favorable network of income tax treaties.
The essential characteristic is the existence of a tax rate which can
create a variety of tax benefits. 0 This applies to jurisdictions with
no relevant direct taxes on the income or capital gains of individu-
als and/or corporations, to jurisdictions where the taxes in question
are generally levied at low rates and to normal tax rate jurisdictions
36. Note, Exchange of Information Under the OECD and U.S. Model Tax Treaties, 5
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 129, 134 (1982); REPORT, supra note 4, at 59-61.
37. Comment, supra note 2, at 677.
38. See, e.g, REPORT, supra note 4, at 14; Spall, International Tax Evasion and Tax
Fraud: Typical Schemes and the Legal Issues Raised by Their Detection and Prosecution,
13 LAW. OF THE AM. 325, 328 (1981). See also INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE, supra
note 30, at 70; F. CHIN, supra note 24, at 2.
Opponents condemn the Report for its definiton:
The propriety of using the term "tax haven" throughout the Report to describe a
country possessing one or more of the above characteristics is questionable, since
that term carries a certain opprobrium that may not be deserved in many, if not
most, cases. In fact, the author of the Report may have used the term to produce
that opprobrium having stated in the Report that "the term 'tax haven' may also be
defined by a 'smell' or reputation test: a country is a tax haven if it is considered to
be one by those who care."
Aland, supra note 10, at 994.
39. Most tax havens offer good travel, telegraph and telephone links to industrial coun-
tries, as well as good business facilities and well trained staffs to expedite haven transactions.
Irish, supra note 23, at 454; W. & D. DIAMOND, supra note 5, R. KINSMAN, supra note 2; M.
LANGER, PRACTICAL INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING (2d ed. 1979).
40. All [tax havens] . . . offer low or no taxes on some category of income ....
REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
[Vol. 17
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which nevertheless have some particular tax advantages like special
exemptions or investment incentives."'
These characteristics are inbred with fiscal, political and accessi-
bility requirements, underlying all of which is an ecomonic basis:
The taxpayer is usually engaged in business activities and tax
havens offer relief from oppressive taxes and other requirements,
which in turn promotes the free and efficient flow of capital. If the
economic transaction was absent, there would be no need for the
use of a tax haven. 2
C. Types and Categories
Students of tax havens have observed various types and catego-
ries of tax havens. The lists of countries in each of the following
categories vary among sources.' s
1. Pure Havens: Havens Having No Taxes
Some countries have no direct taxes on income, profits or capital
gains, death duties, succession taxes or gift and estate taxes. These
countries may impose employment, customs, duty or real property
taxes. There might also exist licensing or registration fees particu-
larly for corporations."
41. INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 30, at 30; Spall, supra note 38, at
451; See van Hoorn, Jr., Problems, Possibilities and Limitations with Respect to Measures
against International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 763 (1978).
42. Irish, supra note 23, at 461-62. Tax havens may act as a catalyst for economic
development. See also de Jantscher, Tax Havens Explained, 13 FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1976, at
31.
43. Tax havens with no taxes include the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Turks
and Caicos Islands, Nauru, Vanuatu, Anorra, Bahrain, Campio, Monoco (with the exception
of French citizens) and Tonga. Havens taxing only local income include Anguilla, Antigua,
Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Israel, Jamaica,
Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Macao, Mont-Serrat, Philippines, St. Helena, St. Vincent,
Sark, Singapore, and Spitsbergen. Jurisdictions with exemption only on foreign income in-
clude Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia, Malaysia, Panama and Puerto Rico. Havens
with tax treaties include the Netherlands Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Barbados, Hondu-
ras and Switzerland. These are not exhaustive lists and some jurisdictions may be classified
within more than one category.
44.
In some of these no-tax havens, a corporation is presented with the sharp alternative
between being allowed to deal locally and being exposed to the prospect of paying
income taxes in some unspecified future in which they may or will be imposed, and
being able to deal locally and having a longterm (however specified) guarantee
against future taxation (being an "exempt" company). The second kind of situation
may seem to be just the thing if one has no real business interest in the haven itself.
But one of the relevant considerations for the application of certain important IRS
Code provisions is whether or not a company does any local business in its domicile
country; that is, does the company have a real "business justicification," or is it just
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2. Liberal Havens: Havens Taxing Only Local Income
Several countries tax income from domestic sources but exempt
all income from foreign sources. A company incorporated in one of
these havens can earn unlimited amounts of foreign source income
without paying any local income tax.4
5
3. Havens with Tax Treaties
Several low-tax countries are parties to tax treaties under which
they offer access to attractive markets to individuals and corpora-
tions who are not residents of the tax havens. The Netherlands An-
tilles, for example, is a party to several favorable income tax trea-
ties. It also has special low tax rates applicable to several classes of
corporate income. This combination of tax treaty and low tax rates
is used successfully by many tax haven companies incorporated in
the Netherlands Antilles. This creates the problem of "treaty shop-
ping" as will be examined later.
4. Special Tax Havens
These are countries that impose all or most of the usual taxes,
but either allow special privileges to special types of companies or
allow very special types of corporate organization. One of the clas-
sic examples is the flexible corporate arrangement offered by
Liechtenstein. 46
a tax dodge?
A. STARCHILD, supra note 5, at 22.
45.
The no-tax on foreign income however breaks down into two groups. There are those
that allow a corporation to do business both internally and externally, taxing only
the income coming from internal sources, and those that require a company to de-
cide at the time incorporation whether it will be one allowed to do local business,
with the consequent tax liabilities, or one permitted to do only foreign business and
thus be exempt from taxation.
Id. at 22-23.
46. The Lichtenstein "anstalt" was one of the earliest tax havens. Formed in 1926 for
the purpose of attracting foreign capital, it has become one of the longest operating. "An
anstalt is an institution of public character permanently dedicated to a public purpose, which
is usually charitable, medical or education." Glos, The Analysis of a Tax Haven: The Liech-
tenstein Anstalt, 18 INT'L LAW. 929, 930 (1984).
Other types of special tax havens include:
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Liechtenstein offer special privi-
leges to qualified holding companies.
Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, in addition to their low rates ... also
recognize a special category of company generally known as a corporation tax com-
pany. Such a company must be managed and controlled from abroad and earn its
income from abroad. If it meets both tests it pays a flat annual fee in lieu of income
tax. Gibraltar has a similar type of company which need not be managed and con-
[Vol. 17
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D. List of Tax Havens
As seen from surveying the various types of categories of tax
havens, any list attempting to identify and actually count the num-
ber of tax havens is impossible to compose. What one government
or investor may consider to be a tax haven for one purpose, another
may not for another purpose. Although it has been said that
"[m]any publications identify jurisdictions as tax havens, the same
jurisdictions generally appear on all the lists."4 Guide books have
been developed which provide lists of tax havens along with essen-
tial information including the addresses of promoters and hotels in
each tax haven .4  The comprehensive listing includes some sixty-
three tax havens.' 9 The Internal Revenue Service officially listed
thirty tax havens in 1982.50
trolled abroad.
Antigua, Barbados, Grenada and St. Vincent each recognizes international busi-
ness companies. These companies have a maximum tax rate of 2.5 percent and they
may even benefit from some tax treaty provisions.
M. LANGER, supra note 5, at 14.
47. M. LANGER, supra note 39, at 279. See also B. SPITZ, supra note 5.
48. See guide books listed supra note 5 and R. KINSMAN, supra note 2. Such guide
books describe the selection process:
The correct selection of a tax haven jurisdiction for the purposes of a proposed
arrangement requires the careful evaluation of a number of general considerations.
Thereafter a detailed examination of the substantive law of those jurisdictions
which are considered suitable, on the basis of the preliminary survey, should be
undertaken with particular regard to the law governing legal entities or equitable
obligations, the fiscal system and the exchange control regulations.
A comparison of tax and non-tax expenditure in each of the jurisdictions under
consideration may also be necessary if cost is a material factor.
B. SPITZ, supra note 5, at 3.
49. W. & D. DIAMOND, supra note 5, lists in its table of contents the following tax
havens: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, British
Virgin Islands, Campione, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey and Sark),
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Greece, Grenada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jamaica,
Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Monaco,
Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Philippines, St. Vin-
cent, San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, Switzerland, Turks and Caicos, United Arab Emir-
ates, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Uruguay and Venezuela. Minor tax havens with limited use
listed are Brunei, New Caledonia, Pitcairn Island, Svalbard, Tonga, North Korea, Djibouti,
Oman, Albania and the Vatican. See also GRUNDY'S TAX HAVENS, supra note 5.
50. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX HAVEN INFORMA-
TION BOOK, Doec. 6743 (1982), listed the following tax haven countries: Antigua, Austria,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Costa Rica, Channel Islands, Jersey, Guetinsey and Saizy Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong Kong,
Isle of Man, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Nauru, the Netherlands, the
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E. Legal Versus Illegal Uses of Tax Havens
As has been seen in defining tax avoidance and evasion, there are
legal and illegal uses of tax havens. Tax avoidance is the result of
the legal use of a tax haven; tax evasion is the result of the illegal
use. One of the major findings of the Report was that there is a
high level of use of tax havens to evade income tax in the United
States.51 The type of tax haven transactions involved include double
trusts, secret bank accounts, false foreign corporate status, various
tax shelter devices, use of a foreign entity to step up the basis of
United States property and recovery of repatriated funds.
52
Tax evasion is usually attained through a method of schemes.
One observation of these schemes is that:
Once incorporated behind the shield of commercial secrecy
laws, a taxpayer can proceed with his illegal schemes. If he wants
to evade taxes, he can buy . . . at inflated prices, reducing his
United States income, increasing his basis in U.S. property, and.
• . increasing the profits of his foreign subsidiary. If the taxpayer
does not wish to evade taxes, but merely wishes to conceal an
illegal source of income, the foreign corporation can buy goods
from the taxpayer at inflated prices, or it can hire the taxpayer as
a "consultant." Either activity can provide a legitimate source for
the income that the taxpayer reports to the I.R.S.
53
Tax evasion is a major and growing problem in the United States
and tax havens have served as a catalyst to this problem. A state-
ment of the consequences of participating in tax evasion was
acutely espoused by the Assistant Attorney General (Tax Division)
in a statement to the Oversight Committee of the House Ways and
Means Committee:
As might be expected, evasion of United States taxes through
sham business transaction involving foreign entities is difficult to
detect, hard to recognize when found, and, where foreign wit-
nesses and documents are crucial, sometimes impossible to prove
in court. Even the most transparent transactions are likely to have
sufficient documentation to satisfy a surface inquiry by an auditor
and enough complexity to discourage a deeper look. Furthermore,
being dependent on form and multiplicity of steps, such transac-
51. REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-7.
52. Id. at 118-23. See also Spall, supra note 38, at 329; Irish, supra note 23, at 477-
79. The major tax haven transactions involving the avoidance of taxes include offshore bank-
ing, international finance subsidiaries and the Eurobond market, captive insurance compa-
nies, tax havens as conduits for foreign investment and transfer pricing. Id. at 462-74.
53. Spall, supra note 38, at 330.
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tions will utilize entities in tax haven jurisidictions offering busi-
ness and banking secrecy to conceal their lack of substance."
There are numerous reports of the illegal uses of tax havens55
which are often misleading or confusing to taxpayers because there
exists both permissible and impermissible uses of tax havens. In
fact, legal tax avoidance has become tainted by the gravity of the
cases involving tax evasion.56 Tax evasion through tax havens may
have an interesting ramification in that some law-abiding citizens
may be hesitant to use tax havens for lawful purposes. There is thus
another reason to cure the abusive use of tax havens: to allow their
proper use.
F. Secrecy
One of the major characteristics of a tax haven, and a tie to its
illegal use, is the haven's commercial and bank secrecy laws.57 A
tax haven jurisdiction must enact secrecy laws in order to protect
tax evaders using the haven. Foreign secrecy laws can therefore be
regarded as promoters of tax havens.' 8
An explanation of the secrecy laws is simple: Third parties, in-
cluding banks, are generally not obliged to furnish information to
tax authorities. Banking secrecy can properly be invoked against
demands by fiscal authorities for production of information. In
some circumstances, however, tax claims can lead to the judicial
lifting of banking secrecy. These circumstances depend on the na-
54. The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Evading Income Taxes:
Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
55. Fictitious tax haven loans were cited in eight criminal indictments charging three
corporations, two lawyers and a bank, all located in a tax haven, with promoting fraudulent
tax shelters. An International Tax Shelter Is Indicted for Tax Fraud, 37 TAXES INT'L, Nov.
1982, at 43.
"The Internal Revenue Service's criminal investigation function has identified 464 cases
for the period, January 1978 through August 1983, containing financial transactions alleg-
edly involving Caribbean Basin countries." TAX HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN, supra
note 5, at 34. See also Anti-Tax Haven Activities of the U.S., 10 INT'L TAX J. 273 (1984);
Kurtz, supra note 5; International Tax Evasion: Spawned in the United States and Nur-
tured by Secrecy Havens, 16 VAND. J. TANSNAT'L L. 757 (1983); and R. BLUM. supra note
24.
56. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
57. Tax evasion schemes utilize foreign haven secrecy laws to escape detection by
United States officials. See Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies:
Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernment Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 255-56 (1983) (testimony and statement of Ros-
coe L. Egger, Jr., Comm'r Internal Revenue Service).
58. "[SJecrecy has a legitimate foundation in [the] nation's history and law, and is
usually a key factor in the nation's economic condition." Egger Discusses Tax Haven
Problems Before House Subcommittee, supra note 23, 1 9947.
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ture of the tax offense.59 Also, the amount of secrecy varies under
different laws. For example, in the Cayman Islands, the statutory
framework is designed to render 99% of all transactions secret com-
pared to the company secrecy laws of Liechtenstein, Hong Kong
and the Bahamas.60
The United States does have methods of circumventing the com-
mercial secrecy laws against United States taxpayers, but the use
of foreign tax havens makes it difficult.61 These methods have in-
cluded federal banking secrecy laws, 62 various customs enforcement
laws and certain civil' s and criminal6'4 penalties contained in the
Internal Revenue Code. Recently, the courts have served as an ex-
cellent means for penetrating tax haven secrecy laws. 5
Another effective means of piercing the secrecy laws has been
exchange of information provisions in tax treaties66 and special mu-
59. For an example of bank secrecy laws, see Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking
Secrecy Under Domestic and International Law, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 273 (1984).
60. Weisland, The Use of Offshore Institutions to Facilitate Criminal Activity in the
United States, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1115, 1118 (1984).
61. Spall, supra note 38, at 330. "The ways in which taxpayers can take advantage of
the opportunities afforded by tax havens and secret foreign bank accounts to evade income
taxes are almost as numerous as the ways of earning money." Comment, supra note 2, at
681.
62. U.S.C. titles 26 & 31.
63. I.R.C. § 982 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) gives the Internal Revenue Service examin-
ers the power to get books and records maintained in foreign jurisdictions and I.R.C. §
6038A (1982 & Supp. 11I 1985) requires the filing of information returns by foreign corpo-
rations otherwise not obligated to report.
64. Increased fines are provided for in I.R.C. §§ 7201 (1982), 7203 (Supp. II! 1985),
7206 (1982) & 7207 (Supp. III 1985).
65. See e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings: United States v. Bowe, 694 F.2d 1256
(I 1th Cir. 1982) (Bahamas lawyer required to testify before a grand jury about tax haven
corporations owned by his United States taxpayer clients); In re Grand Jury Proceedings:
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982) (Canadian bank had
to give to a grand jury a document held in its Bahamas branch about a United States tax-
payer's banking transactions); United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d
341 (7th Cir. 1983) (United States bank not forced to produce documents held in its Greek
branch); In re Grand Jury Proceedings: United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.
1976), (Cayman Islands bank official had to testify before a grand jury about bank accounts
of United States taxpayers) cert. denied 429 U.S. 940 (1076); United States v. Roy R.
Carver, Cayman Islands Civil Appeals No. 5 (1982) (Bank officials from the Cayman Is-
lands, Liechtenstein and Switzerland forced to produce banking documents and testify in a
United States criminal trial); and United States v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 563 F. Supp.
898 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (United States stockbroker ordered to obtain for the Netherlands tax
authorities information from its Swiss branch concerning a Dutch taxpayer). See generally
Penetrating Tax Haven Secrecy Laws, 40 TAXES INT'L, Feb. 1983, at 3.
66. For example, the United States--Switzerland Double Taxation Treaty provides
that "[n]o information shall be exchanged which would disclose any trade, business, indus-
trial or professional secret .. " Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with
Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, art. XVI, 2 U.S.T.
1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316, 127 U.N.T.S. 227.
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tual assistance aggreements. 17 This international information ex-
change mechanism will be the key device in eliminating the secrecy
element, an essential characteristic of tax havens.68
G. The United States as a Tax Haven
At this point, it should be noted that the United States itself is
often considered a tax haven. The United States is characterized as
a tax haven because tax breaks are given to 1) income from foreign
investments in United States real estate and 2) interest income
earned on deposits with United States banks or foreign branches of
United States banks that is paid to foreign persons. 9 While there
are other areas of taxation of foreigners, some nevertheless believe
that the United States can be analyzed as fitting the major charac-
teristics of a tax haven. This conclusion is reached because
1. The United States applies a zero rate of tax on certain catego-
ries of income, including interest received by a nonresident alien
individual or a foreign corporation from banks and savings
institutions;
2. United States banks offer a high level of banking secrecy to
their foreign clients. Unlike domestic clients, foreign clients are ex-
cused from obtaining taxpayer identification numbers, their ac-
67. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302; Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S.
No. 9891; Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12, 1981,
United States-Netherlands, T.I.A.S. 10734.
68. A proposed treaty between the U.S and the Cayman Islands is an excellent exam-
ple of how a treaty can provide for the divulging of financial information:
A new United States-Cayman Islands treaty will provide American law enforcement
agencies wide access to the financial records of Cayman banks, aiding in the fight
against tax fraud and money laundering. The treaty, which now must be ratified by
Britain-Britain handles foreign affairs for its former colony-covers only acts that
are criminal offenses in both countries. The United States and the Islands will coop-
erate in providing bank, business and government records, the taking of testimony
and depositions by witnesses, searches and seizures of evidence, and the transfer of
individuals in custody for testimony.
TAX NOTES INT'L (July 23, 1986).
"The treaty also permits the Cayman Islands to turn over bank records in cases involving
tax fraud and false tax statements. The treaty will not cover simple tax evasion, since the
Islands do not have tax laws." Nash, U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, N.Y. Times, July
4, 1986, at DIO, col. 2. See also Day, Cayman Island Gives U.S. Access to Bank Records,
Wash. Post, July 4, 1986, at Fl, col. 3.
69. Irish, supra note 23, at 451. In 1984, Congress repealed the 30% withholding re-
quirement on portfolio interest of foreigners. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
127, 98 Stat. 494, 648-53 (1984), codified in 26 U.S.C. §§ I - 9602 (1982, Supp. 11 1984 &
Supp. 1II 1985). This further weakened the view that the United States is a tax haven. See
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counts are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service and there
is no withholding tax;
3. The United States relies on banking as an important segment of
its economy;
4. The United States has extremely modern communication
facilities;
5. The United States does not impose currency controls on
nonresidents;
6. It is questionable whether the United States is a self-promoter of
its tax haven status; and
7. The United States has a favorable income tax treaty network.
70
Realistically, there is no real impact of this analytical note: The
United States cannot be classified as one of the world's tax havens
based on its limited areas of tax breaks and its complex and abra-
sive tax structure.
It is also interesting to note that the Virgin Islands, a United
States possession, is also often classified as a tax haven. This is pri-
marily because the transfer of installment obligations to the Virgin
Islands may present an opportunity for tax avoidance. 71 However,
the Virgin Islands generally employs a system of taxation similar to
that of the United States, reducing concerns that it is a tax haven.
72
H. United States Law
A cursory survey of United States tax laws pertaining to taxing
foreign transactions reveals little that applies directly to tax havens.
There is no direct provision which deals specifically and exclusively
with tax havens. As has been commented,
[tihe Congress has never sought to eliminate tax haven operations
by U.S. taxpayers. Instead, from time to time, the Congress has
identified abuses and legislated to eliminate them. The result is a
patchwork of anti-avoidance provisions, some intended to deal
particularly with tax havens, although of general application, and
some intended to deal with more general abuse situations, but
which might also be used by the IRS to deal with tax haven
70. See Langer, Antilles Hearings: "'Treaty Shopping" Continues to Be a Hot Topic,
42 TAXES INT'L, Apr. 1983, at 51.
71. See Berney, Transfer of Installment Obligations to the U.S. Virgin Islands, 7
INT'L TAX J. 229 (1981); D'Avino, Foreign Investment Incentives in the U.S. Virgin Islands:
Part I, 10 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Feb. 1983, at 8.
72. For complete details on the United States Virgin Islands system of taxation, see
W. & D. DIAMOND, supra note 5.
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transactions.7 3
Clearly, tax havens in themselves do not provide a tax advantage
to taxpayers in the United States. The advantage is a combination
of both the United States system deferring taxation of earnings of
foreign corporations and the United States system consolidating
world-wide foreign tax credits.7 " The United States' best legislative
attempt to deal with tax avoidance through tax havens resulted in
the Revenue Act of 1962 and Subpart F of the Internal Revenue
Code.
7 5
Subpart F, which focuses on defined activities conducted abroad
generally considered tax haven devices, taxes United States share-
holders of a United States controlled foreign corporation on certain
categories of income. Additionally, Internal Revenue Code section
482 authorizes the Internal Revenue Commissioner to reallocate in-
come among related entities to properly reflect their incomes.
The Report examined the operations of the current law and
presented suggestions for legislative change. Subpart F and sec-
tion 482 are still the primary bases of the United States legislative
policy regarding tax havens. More specific direct legislation is
needed in order to offer an alternative to prevent tax haven abuse.
III. INCOME TAX TREATIES
Income tax treaties are useful means for resolving double taxa-
tion by two countries. Their history and use is of vast importance in
relation to the tax haven problem; tax haven abuses have recently
been the major factor in the negotiation and ratification of several
income tax treaties. In fact, their use has often been hailed as the
solution to today's problem of tax havens.
73. REPORT, supra note 4, at 42.
74.
Nowhere is this tension more apparent than when it is focused on tax havens. No-
where is the failure to resolve the policy issues more obvious. Congress over the
years, while maintaining deferral of tax on the earnings of foreign corporations con-
trolled by U.S. persons, has at the same time passed numerous anti-avoidance provi-
sions generally intended to solve perceived tax haven-related problems. All have had
numerous exceptions, have been complex and difficult to administer, and all have
had gaps (many intended, some not).
Id. at 43.
75. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
76. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 135-46. The Report does not present as an option
the expansion of Subpart F to reach all types of income earned by controlled foreign corpora-
tions. Aland, supra note 10, at 1014. A more recent suggestion has been a federal transfer
tax on the movement of assets to tax haven countries. Stark Calls for Action Against Tax
Havens, supra note 3.
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A. History, Use and Importance of Income Tax Treaties
Income tax treaties have been most successful in their prevention
of double taxation.7 7 The only other significant way to offer relief
from double taxation is unilateral actions by the individual coun-
tries themselves.7 8 The other important purposes of income tax
treaties include resolution of disputes, prevention of fiscal evasion,
avoidance of excessive taxation and advancement of a country's ec-
onomic and foreign policy.7 9 Income tax treaties generally provide
for a reduction in the level of tax applicable to payments from
sources within either of the contracting countries. They also offer
the administrative mechanisms for accomplishing this goal. 80 The
treaties and tax havens of today cannot, however, be understood
without a view of the history of income tax treaties.
Tax treaties are a result of economics. They originated as a vital
role in the commerce between nations.8 1 Their beginnings, which
date to the middle of the 19th century,82 were rooted in the desire
for mutual assistance between states to suppress international tax
77. HELLAWELL & PUGH, THE STUDY OF FEDERAL TAX LAW: TRANSNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 1 2110 (1983); Foster, The Importance of Tax Treaties, 5 HASTINGS INT'L
& CoMp. L. REV. 565 (1982); Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in
Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428 (1963); REPORT, supra note 4, at 147.
For a detailed background on double taxation, see Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies
and Issues, 15 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 763 (1983).
Reduction of double taxation is accomplished through exclusion of certain income from
taxation, a special rate on certain types of income and provisions for "competent authority"
for procedural redress. Note, Tax Treaties, 14 INT'L LAW 508 (1980).
"There are five principal purposes for double taxation treaties:
(1) Mutuality of relief;
(2) Equal and equitable treatment of taxpayers;
(3) Accommodation of differing tax systems;
(4) Resolving conflicts; and
(5) Exchange of information." Tomsett, Tax Treaties Between Developing Countries of Asia
and North America, Europe, Japan and Australia, 12 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Mar. 1985, at
9, 10. This is an excellent article on the recent concern of initiating tax treaties with develop-
ing countries.
78. Such relief is normally given by crediting foreign taxes against domestic taxes on
foreign source of income and gains, by exempting foreign source income and gains from
domestic taxes and by allowing foreign taxes as a deduction in computing income and gains
for domestic tax purposes. Tomsett, supra note 77, at 9. Double taxation is generally miti-
gated in the United States by permitting a tax credit for income taxes paid in foregin coun-
tries. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985).
79. Rosenbloom, Current Developments in Regard to Tax Treaties, INST. ON FED.
TAX'N § 31.1, § 31.03 (1982); Chapoton Explains U.S. Tax Haven Treaty Policy, supra
note 23.
80. Freud, Treaty Shopping and the 1981 United States Draft Model Income Tax
Treaty, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 627 (1983); HELLAWELL & PUGH, supra note
77, 1 2101. "This central thrust ... limiting the taxation of the host or source country ...
explains why the United States has so few treaties with developing countries." Id.
81. Foster, supra note 77.
82. INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 30, at 21.
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evasion through the exchange of information. After the world wars,
income tax treaties flourished. Several existing treaties were ex-
panded to multilateral agreements to apply to the colonies of the
commerce bearing nations.88
The United States' use of income tax treaties, and the efforts in
recent years to limit benefits under bilateral income tax treaties,
have been well documented.8" The United States has specifically
subscribed to a distinct policy of limiting its economic benefits
through its tax treaties.
Along these lines, the United States has pursued one of the ma-
jor purposes of tax treaties, the prevention of fiscal evasion.05 Such
fiscal evasion usually involves the illegal avoidance of taxes or tax
evasion which, unlike the avoidance of double taxation, is not al-
ways a subject of shared international concern. The prevention of
fiscal evasion is a goal which is pursued principally through the ex-
change of tax-related information. There are times when the goal
of fiscal evasion and double taxation become intermingled and
counter-productive.86 Without bilateral assistance, the ability of the
83. The first multilateral concerns with international tax evasion can be found in the
work of the League of Nations. Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report and Resolutions
Submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Comm. of the League of Nations,
League of Nations Doc. F 212 (Feb. 7, 1925).
84. See. e.g., Tax Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. Foreign Relations,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For a detailed history on the United States use of tax treaties,
see Rosenbloom, supra note 77, at 779-85; Comment, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An
Overview of Prevention Techniques, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 626 (1983).
85.
Treaty partners have a mutual desire to avoid double taxation, because double taxa-
tion may impede international commerce to the detriment of both countries. How-
ever, while each country doubtless has a strong interest in preventing evasion of its
taxes, there is no such direct interest in regard to evasion of the other country's
taxes. On the contrary, no nation ever has a direct interest in ensuring that its tax-
payers pay greater taxes to another country.
Rosenbloom, supra note 79, § 31.03[3]. As will be seen, this is a second major goal of the
Model Income Tax Conventions. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
86.
If double-tax treaties grant alleviations but impose no new burdens, then they must
by definition permit the avoidance of tax by comparison with the previous situation.
But it is another question whether this avoidance is undesirable and ought to be
hindered by other measures.
The international tax avoidance in question is a consequence of differences be-
tween tax systems, whether in rates or structures. If the treaty partners had identi-
cal systems, the problem would disappear.
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 30, at 153.
A comparison of the tax treaties of the world would show a wide variety of explic-
itly stated purposes: no generalizations are possible and each tax treaty must be
judged on its own characteristics to assess whether and how far the treaty partners
are attempting to combat tax avoidance, "improper" use or even "abuse" of the
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United States to collect tax-related information is limited.17
The United States has interpreted most of its tax treaties as per-
mitting three methods of providing information:
First, a routine or automatic transmittal of information, con-
sisting generally of lists of names of U.S. resident taxpayers re-
ceiving passive income from sources with the treaty partner, and
notifications of changes in foreign law.
Second, requests for specific information, which generally are
requests of the U.S. competent authority for information. Specific
requests for information also result from simultaneous examina-
tions of... taxpayers....
Third, spontaneous exchange of information at the discretion of
the transmitting country.88
The exchange of information goal can also be pursued via a mutual
assistance agreement.89
An overview of the importance of income tax treaties cannot be
made without a brief survey of the treaty process in the United
States.90 Clause 2 of section 2 of article II of the United States
Constitution provides that the President "shall have power, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present concur ... ." This clause
means that the treaty power can be invoked only by the executive
branch. The formal role of Congress is confined to the Senate and
is limited to giving, or withholding, its "advice or consent."91 If ad-
vice and consent is given, the President is empowered to make or
ratify a treaty. The multiple nature of the process92 is a treaty pol-
87. Success depends on the Internal Revenue Service being aware that information
does or may exist, on gaining access to the information while resolving conflicts between the
United States and foreign law, on the willingness of the foreign jurisdictions to cooperate
and, in criminal cases, on receiving information in a form admissible in courts. REPORT,
supra note 4, at 197-98.
88. Id. at 207-08.
89. For detailed information on the exchange of information agreements, see articles
infra notes 102-06 and Note, Information Disclosure and Competent Authority: A Proposal,
17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 485 (1985).
90. Tax treaties are defined for this purpose as "generally-worded, bilateral instru-
ments that rest on complex revenue legislation. The treaties modify, restrict and expand the
operation of the underlying revenue laws without radically altering them." Osgood, Inter-
preting Tax Treaties in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, 17 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 255, 265-57 (1984).
91. "A tax treaty has particular importance in foreign policy terms because of two of
its typical features: (1) It truly matters, on a continuing, dollars-and-cents basis, to a variety
of persons from both countries; and, (2) Its administration requires ongoing contacts between
official representatives of the treaty partners." This is the reason for the Senate's involve-
ment. Rosenbloom, supra note 79, § 31.02[3).
92. For articles dealing with the treaty process, see Rosenbloom, supra note 79; Fos-
ter, supra note 77; Note, supra note 89.
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icy problem in itself.93 Tax treaties inevitably conflict with tax rules
and policies within this country as implied in the stated definition
and as interpreted by a treaty's authority and precedence.
Clause 2 of article VI of the United States Constitution provides
that treaties made under the authority of the United states, like
federal laws, are "the supreme law of the land . . . -9" The legal
authority of the tax treaties is thus equal to that of federal statutes.
A treaty "may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of
Congress may supersede a prior treaty," but there must be clear
evidence that it was intended to do so. 95 If a conflict exists between
the two, courts will always endeavor, if feasible, to construe them
so as to give effect to both.96 If the legislation and the treaty cannot
be interpreted as consistent with each other, accepted cannons of
construction favor the more recent provision.
97
The Internal Revenue Code has recognized the obligation and
desirability of honoring international tax agreements and provides
to that end that statutory rules taxing income will yield to rules
preventing the imposition of United States income tax.98 Further-
more, section 7852(d) states that "no provision of this title shall
apply in any case where its application would be contrary to any
treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date of enact-
93.
But perhaps the major consideration in treaty policy remains the process for sorting
out the relationship of U.S. income tax treaties and the Internal Revenue Code. The
persistence of this structural issue is possibly unique to the United States among the
developed countries and is largely attributable to the separate delegations of author-
ity not only between the executive and legislative branches, but also the delegation
of treaty-making power to the Senate while revenue measures are initiated in the
House of Representatives. U.S. tax treaties are negotiated by the executive branch
and are submitted solely to the Senate for its advice and consent. In the Senate, the
treaties are under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations, while tax
legislation is under the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee. On the other hand,
the Constitution contemplates that Congressional legislation on revenue measures
will originate in the House of Representatives .... The potential for tension between
treaty rules and statutory rules has increased in the past decade as the United
States has been more active in joining other countries in a worldwide network of
income tax treaties, while at the same time domestic tax rules have increasingly
been brought under the microscope of Congressional examination.
Patrick, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Pending U.S. Income Tax Trea-
ties, 12 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Sept. 1985, at 3.
94. Tax treaties fall within this clause. Samann v. Comm'r, 313 F.2d 461, 463 (4th
Cir. 1963); American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957).
95. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (II Wall) 616, 621 (1871) (footnotes omitted).
96. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See also United States v. Payne,
264 U.S. 446 (1924); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
97. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
98. I.R.C. § 894 (1982).
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ment of this title." 99
Lastly, the importance of interpreting tax treaties on the interna-
tional level must be considered.100 As viewed, a tax treaty usually
prevails over a nation's laws. Recently, tax treaty partners have
come to use the treaty mechanism known as "competent authority"
for treaty interpretation. "Competent authority" is a process
designed to resolve disputes arising under the provisions of the
treaty. Each contracting state delegates a competent authority to
serve as its representative for interpreting and implementing the
treaty. The delegates may consult with each other, but the treaty
does not require the authorities to come to an agreement, nor does
it provide any mechanism for binding them to a decision. 0
99. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1982).
As previously examined and from viewing the authority itself, one can see this is becoming
a tax treaty policy issue which can become crucial to a treaty's ratification. Senator Robert
Dole has commented on this issue:
However, the displacement of the policies established in the Code by the some-
times conflicting policies established through the tax treaty process give me . . .
cause for some concern. Particularly as the United States tax treaty network grows
and as tax treaties become more detailed and complex, this concern regarding the
possible conflicts between the tax legislative process and the tax treaty process can
only increase.
Equally important [to suggestions of members of the Senate Finance Committee],
further initiatives to improve the coordination of the tax legislative process with the
tax treaty process will come. . . . Such initiatives should include, at a minimum,
consultation with the chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Finance
and Ways and Means Committees at several stages of the treaty negotiation
process.
First, before negotiations are commenced, I suggest that the Treasury notify Con-
gress regarding the reasons for seeking a new tax treaty ... [or] an explanation of
the specific provisions of the extant treaty and the U.S. or foreign law, and an ex-
planation of any changed economic conditions, which together may give rise to the
need for a revised treaty. Further, the Treasury might provide Congress with a
description of the goals hoped to be achieved through the adoption of a new treaty
or protocol. For treaties with nations with whom we have no existing treaty such
notification should include a description of the problems U.S. taxpayers may experi-
ence in commercial and other contacts with the other nation's taxing jurisdiction,
the commercial activity that might be fostered by such a treaty, and what interests
of the U.S. might be served by promoting trade with or investment between the
U.S. and the other nation ...
Second, once negotiations have commenced, periodic consultation with Congress
regarding progress, problems, and the choices among options in the treaty negotia-
tion process could facilitate the process of later Senate ratification ...
Third, the Treasury should find it useful during the tax legislative process itself,
to keep the tax-writing committees abreast of the impact of pending legislation on
ongoing treaty regulations. . . . Coordination between treaty negotiators and those
involved in the tax legislative process could avoid the development of conflicting
provisions.
Dole Comments on Pending Tax Treaties, 13 TAx NOTES 1005 (1981).
100. INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 30, at 315.
101. Note, supra note 89, at 487 n.12.
In a competent authority proceeding, representatives of the treaty partners negotiate
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B. Model Treaties
Two model income tax treaties have been proposed. Both could
affect the way tax havens operate, particularly by requiring specific
exchanges of information. In 1963, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development proposed a model treaty with the ob-
ject of eliminating tax evasion and providing for the exchange of
information. 102 The United States voiced initial opposition to this
model treaty, but during the 1960's, the United States signed many
protocols and treaties with the purpose of adopting similar provi-
sions, as far as appropriate, to those in the model OECD Conven-
tion.103 In 1981, the Department of the Treasury issued its final
Model Income Tax Treaty which was similar to the OECD model,
but strenghened and expanded provisions dealing with benefits to
third parties. This model is applicable to tax havens.104
Both models contain identical limitation provisions on exchanges
of information. The contracting parties are not required to go be-
yond their own internal laws or administrative practices to obtain
information for the requesting country. Further, both parties must
treat information received as confidential, to be used only in tax
proceedings concerning taxes covered by the convention. A party
may disseminate information only to those involved in the collection
of taxes or enforcement of tax laws.
The United States model is broader in scope than the OECD
model in that it requires information to be provided in an authenti-
a resolution to a double taxation problem arising under the provision of the applica-
ble treaty. The competent authority negotiations and eventual resolution represent a
settlement between the IRS and a treaty partner regarding taxpayer liability on a
particular issue and set of facts. This settlement is similar to a private letter ruling
in that the taxpayer requests assistance from the IRS. Currently, the only public
releases of information on competent authority are two revenue procedures, statis-
tics on the number of cases accepted and resolved, and periodic public statements by
treasury officials.
Id. at 487 (foonotes omitted). See also International Taxation: Competent Authorites Share
Their Concerns, 32 TAX NOTES 573 (1986).
102. OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVEN-
TION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (rev. ed. 1977). For articles on the model treaties, see
Note, supra note 36; Tomsett, supra note 77; Rosenbloom, supra note 77.
103. Surrey, Factors Affecting U.S. Treasury in Conducting International Tax Trea-
ties, 28 J. TAX'N 277 (1968).
104. Article 16 of the United States Model Treaty excludes corporations from benefits
when those corporations enjoy special tax benefits in a treaty country, or when those corpora-
tions are owned by a substantial number of shareholders who are not residents of either
treaty country (designated "third country residents"). Freud, supra note 80. The 1981 Draft
Model Treaty provision is more specific and applies more broadly than the 1977 Model
Treaty provision. Additionally, the 1981 Draft Model Treaty provision is less dependent on
the internal law of its treaty partner. Id. at 648.
1987]
25
Belotsky: The Prevention of Tax Havens Via Income Tax Treaties
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
cated form. A country, however, can produce the authenticated in-
formation only if permitted by its own laws. The United States
model also provides for the collection of taxes, if necessary, to en-
sure that the tax benefits of the convention do not inure to persons
not entitled to them.105 The United States' provisions indicate the
desire to use tax treaties for obtaining information in a form which
can withstand scrutiny under United States rules of evidence. Both
models are valuable attempts to address the tax haven problem.10 6
C. Treaty Shopping
The extensive use of tax treaties has resulted in "treaty shop-
ping" which has a significant impact on tax havens, specifically in
their selection by tax evaders.
"Treaty shopping" has been defined as "the ability of residents of
countries other than the countries that are parties to the treaty to
derive treaty benefits (such as rate reduction on passive income) by
channeling investments through entities in organized or resident in
a treaty jurisdiction. 107 Treaty shopping must always be consid-
105. Oliva, The Treasury's Twenty Year Battle with Treaty Shopping: Article 16 of
the 1977 United States Model Treaty, 14 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 293, 294 (1984). See
also Rosenbloom, supra note 79, § 31.04[2] for details on the United States' adoption of the
OECD Model.
106. Critics have added that the model treaties could go further and provide that
source countries should forego tax on interest income entirely, rather than imposing a with-
holding tax at a rate no higher than 10%. Also, the critics believe that the United States
treaties should not extend benefits to residents of third countries, and tax treaties should not
be used to grant United States tax benefits to United States citizens and residents. Rosen-
bloom, supra note 79, § 31.04[3].
107. Chapoton Explains U.S. Tax Haven Treaty Policy. supra note 23, 9946. The
Internal Revenue Service explains the practice as follows:
"Treaty shopping" is the practice of taking advantage of treaty benefits (primar-
ily exemptions and reduced rates of tax) by individuals, corporations or other enti-
ties not entitled to these benefits. A major device for treaty shopping is the interpo-
sition of an intermediate entity, located in the treaty country, between the ultimate
investor and the investment. That entity receives the income from U.S. sources in
the form of dividends, interest, royalties, etc. If it qualifies as a resident of the treaty
country, the intermediate entity may obtain a reduced rate or exemption from the
30% withholding tax imposed by the U.S. on gross investment income. After receipt
of the payment, the intermediate entity may then pay dividends and/or interest to
the ultimate investor, a nonqualifying recipient in a third country which does not
have a treaty with the United States, with little or no tax being paid to the treaty
country. These intermediate entities have been used to claim benefits under several
U.S. tax treaties.
Egger Discusses Tax Haven Problems Before House Subcommittee, supra note 23, t 9947.
Another definition is "the practice of establishing entities in countries having favorable
income tax treaties with the United States, in order to secure a lower U.S. withholding tax
rate on 'fixed or determinable annual periodical [sic] gains, profits and income' (I.R.C. §
1441(b)) or some other benefit particular to a given treaty." Freud, supra note 80, at 627.
Commentators also see treaty shopping as having a dual purpose: "Some consider treaty
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ered a factor when dealing with the abuses of tax treaties or tax
treaty problems.
The significant use of another countries' treaties through treaty
shopping has been a longstanding concern of the United States.108
Several specific treaties are known for their abuses.'09 With regard
to tax havens, treaties are often used by residents of a nontreaty
country to achieve a reduction in United States taxation.
Although most of this use is not fraudulent, some is abusive and
inconsistent with present United States tax policy. The low rates
of tax coupled with the anonymity afforded by tax havens do,
however, give rise to some fraudulent use.
United States taxpayers, particularly multinational corpora-
tions, may also use the United States treaty network tax havens
to their advantage. The most widely known use is that of Nether-
lands Antilles finance subsidiaries to achieve zero rates of tax on
interest paid on foreign borrowings. Often, the advantages which
can be achieved through tax haven treaties can also be achieved
through treaties with non-tax havens." 0
shopping to serve a permissible policy purpose of attracting foreign capital to the United
States, some consider treaty shopping an abuse that exacerbates a perceived inequity under
which nonresidents of the United States generally pay less tax on their U.S. portfolio invest-
ments than do residents. Id. See also Comment, supra 84, at 627-28; SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS. REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF MALTA, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 30, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981).
108.
The [IRS] in recent years has been particularly concerned about third-country resi-
dents' use of bilateral income treaties to avoid paying tax on United States source
income. A "third- country resident" is an individual who is not a resident or citizen
of the United States or a country party to a tax treaty with the United States.
Treasury Regulation § 1.871-2(b) which defines "residence" for an individual pro-
vides: "an alien actually present in the United States who is not a mere transient or
sojouner is a resident of the United States for purposes of the income tax." Treas.
Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957). The term "third-country resident" should not be confused
with the term "nonresident alien individual," which includes those individuals who
are residents or citizens of other countries party to a tax treaty with the United
States. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(a) (1957). The rules used to determine the source of
income are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 861-864 (1981).
Comment, supra note 84, at 626 & nn.1-2 (citation ommitted).
109. The following three treaties are examples of those widely abused by United
States treaty partners: United States-Netherlands Antilles Income Tax Convention, Con-
vention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Apr. 29, 1948, United
States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855 (extended to the Netherlands Antilles
by Protocol, June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366; amended by Protocol, Oct.
23, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665; modified by Convention, Dec. 30, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6051); United States-Luxembourg Income Tax Convention, Con-
vention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962, United States-Lux-
embourg, 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726; and Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, supra note 66. See Granwell, Treaty Shop-
ping-Recent United States Developments, 12 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Sept. 1985, at 7.
110. REPORT, supra note 4, at 147.
Treaty oriented tax evasion via treaty shopping includes: (a) recycling funds (legally
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The third country resident use of tax treaties can take on various
forms."1 "Successful treaty shopping [as the report outlines] gener-
ally consists of three elements: (1) a reduction of source country
taxation; (2) a low or zero effective rate of tax in the payee treaty
country; and (3) a low or zero rate of tax on payments from the
payee treaty country to the taxpayer." 1 2 Many of these elements
apply to non-tax haven income tax treaties as well as tax haven
treaties. 113
The United States has taken a hard-line stance on treaty shop-
ping."1 4 This has first been attempted by including a provision in
article 16 of both model treaties defining third party residents so as
to limit the treaty benefits to specific taxpayers.
It is the policy of this administration not to enter into new trea-
ties which permit ... benefits to residents of third countries and,
as appropriate, to renegotiate, or, if necessary, to terminate ex-
isting treaties to accomplish this objective. Limitation of benefits
provisions ...will be employed wherever necessary and in the
form appropriate to the circumstances, to ensure that U.S. policy
are [sic] met by the extension of benefits in our tax treaties.,
1 5
Recent tax legislation has focused on limiting treaty shopping in
various ways including tightening the definition of nonresident
or illegally) in the U.S. or abroad back into the United States through a treaty
country after it has first been laundered in a non-treaty tax haven jurisdiction; (b)
fraudulent use by United States persons to remove income from the United States
at reduced rates of tax by masquerading as foreign taxpayers; and (c) fraudulent
use by foreigners to obtain benefits of treaty rates.
Id. at 159.
111. See id. at 153-57.
112. Id. at 158.
113. It should be noted that the United States model treaty in article 16 directly at-
tempts to prohibit treaty shopping and that both model treaties attempt to limit treaty shop-
ping by providing a definition of "third party residents."
114. The reasons underlying United States policy are:
(I) A limitation of benefits provision permits the United States to expand its income
tax treaty network to countries with which it does not have a treaty and also to
renegotiate its existing treaty network;
(2) A limitation of benefits provision assures that tax treaty benefits flow only to
intended beneficiaries; and
(3) A limitation of benefits provision assures that important tax policy judgments
are made by the United States.
Granwell, supra note 109, at 7-8. Some disagree:
[A]nalyzing the development of anti-treaty shopping provisions in United States bi-
lateral tax treaties ... demonstrates that the Treasury Department has maneuvered
the United States into a very weak position from which to combat treaty shopping,
by failing to adopt and implement a consistent policy of including anti-treaty shop-
ping provisions in the United States in tax treaties.
Comment, supra note 84, at 632.
115. Comment, supra note 84, at 626; Chapoton Authors Treasury Policy on Treaty
Shopping, 19 TAX NOTES 249 (1983).
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aliens.116 Also, the Internal Revenue Service recently issued two
published revenue rulings which have further reinforced the posi-
tion that the United States has taken against treaty shopping.
117
IV. COLLATERAL PERSPECTIVES
Before analyzing the effectiveness of tax treaties to prevent tax
havens, it is useful to examine the tax haven problem from a few
different perspectives.
First, a look at other mechanisms to prevent tax havens will be
taken. A recent and innovative method of solving the tax haven
problem has been the use of the courts which should be pursued as
an option. Second, an examination of the tax haven problem as it
exists in other countries and those countries' attempts to solve the
problem will be made for any useful precedents which could be
adopted in the Unites States.
A. The Use of the Courts
A majority of the recent court cases have revolved around the
production of documents and fiscal information.118 These cases have
been significant in breaking through the barriers set up by the se-
crecy laws of the tax haven countries and in providing for the effec-
tive exchange of information.11 9
An important and early case in "directly" preventing tax havens
was Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner.1 10 There, a United
States corporation borrowed money from its Bahamian parent and
116. See REPORT, supra note 4; Aland, supra note 10; IRS Faces Treaty Shopping
Quandry, 26 TAx NOTES 850 (1985).
117. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381, provided that the interest payments by a
United States subsidiary of a Swiss parent to that parent's Netherlands Antilles subsidiary
which arose from a financial arrangement whereby the Swiss parent loaned funds to its An-
tilles subsidiary which in turn loaned those funds to the United States subsidiary, were not
exempt from United States tax under article VIII(l) of the United States-Netherlands In-
come Tax Convention as extended to the Netherlands Antilles.
Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, held that interest payments that a domestic subsidiary
of a United States parent made to that parent's Netherlands Antilles subsidiary, which arose
from a financial arrangement whereby the Antilles subsidiary issued bonds to foreign persons
and loaned the proceeds to the domestic subsidiary, were not exempt from United States
taxes under article VIII(I) of the United States-Netherlands Income Tax Convention as
extended to the Netherlands Antilles.
118. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
119. See United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975), which held
that foreign countries can obtain tax information concerning domestic companies through the
Internal Revenue Service exchange of information provision. This case construed the Con-
vention on Double Taxation: Taxes on Income, March 4, 1942, United States-Canada, 56
Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983.
120. 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
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issued it a promissory note. A Honduran company was then
formed. The parent company transferred the U.S. corporation's
note to the Honduran company in exchange for demand notes bear-
ing the same rate of interest. The U.S. corporation claimed exemp-
tion from its withholding obligation under the then-effective United
States-Honduras income tax convention which exempted from
withholding tax interest received by a Hondurn corporation from a
U.S. corporation. Although not stated in the case, interest pay-
ments by the Honduran company to its Bahamian parent presuma-
bly were not taxed by Honduras.
The United States Tax Court held that the exemption did not
apply because the treaty language exempted interest from United
States sources "received by" a Honduran corporation. Under the
court's interpretation of the facts, the interest was not received by a
Honduran corporation. The court interpreted the words "received
by" to mean something more than merely obtaining physical pos-
session of the funds coupled with an obligation to pass them on to a
third party. Since there was no change in the inflow and outflow of
the interest payments and since the three companies were all mem-
bers of the same corporate family, the interposition of the Hondu-
ran company and transfer of the notes to it lacked any valid eco-
nomic business purpose. The Honduran company was merely a
conduit for the passage of interest payments from Aiken to the Ba-
hamian company. It had no actual beneficiary interest in the inter-
est payments and, in substance, Aiken was paying the interest to
the Bahamian company. In this way, the case prevented use of the
Hounduran tax haven.
Recently, two developments have occurred in tax haven litiga-
tion. These developments do not concern the prevention of tax
havens, but rather demonstrate the use of the courts for tax haven
interpretation problems. In one case, the court dismissed a criminal
case against two crude oil dealers and one of their lawyers, thus
raising doubts about the constitutionality of a question asked on a
federal individual income tax form about the use of foreign tax
havens."' Also, the government of Guam has filed suit to have de-
clared null and void a revenue ruling and a Treasury decision that
would prevent Guam from becoming an international tax haven.'
121. United States v. Eisenberg, Cr. No. H81-09 (S.D. Tex. 1981). See also Constitu-
tionality of IRS Tax Haven Form Questioned, Legal Times of Wash., Mar. 30, 1981, at 2,
Col. 1.
122. The Guam controversy has been building for some time. See Guam Sues Trea-
[Vol. 17
30
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol17/iss1/3
THE PREVENTION OF TAX HAVENS
There has also been a move for extra-territorial litigation. The
result desired by such actions is to encourage the affected govern-
ments to come to the bargaining table to arrange for more organ-
ized and predictable information disclosure arrangements.123
The courts might play an important role and at some future
point become useful in the tax haven problem as demonstrated by
these precedents. However, for the time being, the courts are only




The problem of tax havens and evasion of income tax is a prob-
lem that confronts not only the United States, but also other na-
tions. The Report suggests that the concerns of foreign countries
regarding the problem are deeper than those of the United
States.2 5 As stated in the Report, "[f]oreign governments have also
been concerned with the use of tax havens to avoid or evade their
taxes. Some countries have adopted legislative provisions intended
to limit the use of tax havens by their nationals. Many of these
provisions are based on United States law."126
The major method of fighting tax havens by foreign countries has
been legislative. It is very important to note that Canada, France,
Germany, Japan and the Netherlands have provisions in their tax
laws that are more limited than the present United States provi-
sions. Conversely, a vast majority of countries have no provisions at
all. 
7
sury Over Tax Haven Ruling, 21 TAX NOTES 921 (1983); and Guam, Treasury at Logger-
heads Over Tax Rules, 19 TAX NOTES 244 (1983).
123. Weisland, supra note 60, at 1133.
124. See supra note 65 and the following articles regarding the use of litigation to
curtail tax haven activities: An Intending Trader, TAX'N, May 4, 1985, at 85; Writ Issued in
Test of Law on Tax Havens, N.Y. L.J., Jan. I1, 1985, at 1. See also Marc Rich & Co. v.
United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); and In re
Grand Jury, 550 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that the grand jury subpoenas
served on the United States branch of a foreign bank in New York calling for customer
records held by the bank were enforceable).
125. REPORT, supra note 4, at 24; Gordon, supra note 11. Problems of international
evasion are not new. The first tax treaty, signed August 12, 1843, was an agreement concern-
ing administrative assistance between Belgium and France. MANUAL FOR THE NEGOTIATION
OF BILATERAL TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N.
Doc. St/ESA/94 (1979). The concern about tax havens is illustrated by a German-French
memorandum on the International level, found at 14 EUR. TAX. 136 (Apr. 1974).
126. REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
127. Aland, supra note 10, at 1013-14. There are variations in the details of the for-
eign legislation, but the basic approach adopted by each country, including the United
States, is to impose a charge on certain types of unremitted income of overseas companies
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1. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has been at the forefront in attempting to
prevent tax havens. The United Kingdom has always been prone to
tax haven abuse by its constant engagement in foreign travel by
residents, international emphasis on expansion of the British Em-
pire and convenience of the British flag.
In 1981, the United Kindgom Inland Revenue issued a "Consult-
ative Document," which served as a proposition paper of official
policy regarding tax havens, and solicited comments on possible
legislation to counter tax haven abuse. This paper stated:
Section 482 [of the Code of Inland Revenue]... has for nearly 30
years been the main provision for countering international tax
avoidance in the corporate sector. Until 1979 it was reinforced by
exchange control which imposed constraints on international
transfers. With the abolition of exchange control it is necessary to
consider whether the provisions of section 482 should be retained.
The section makes unlawful company migrations, transfers of
trade abroad and certain transactions relating to overseas compa-
nies in a [U]nited [K]ingdom group without Treasury consent,
and the penalties for infringement include imprisonment as well
as fines. Arguably these provisions are not appropriate against a
background of free exchanges.1"8
The British anti-tax haven proposition paper, which suggested reve-
nue patrols and direct taxes, solicited great debate in the United
Kingdom.129 A majority of commentators preferred modified taxing
which are controlled by its residents. The resident shareholder is made liable for his propor-
tionate share of the income of the controlled foreign company and is subject to relief for
overseas taxes on that income, all normally exempt profits which arise from overseas trading
activities and small shareholdings and small amounts of income. Tax Havens and the Corpo-
rate Sector (Great Britain), 131 NEW L.J. 135 (1981); Tiley, UK: Draft Clauses on Interna-
tional Tax Avoidance, 9 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Feb. 1982, at 4. See legislative comparisons
in chart form of the taxing aspects of foreign corporations in Canada, France, United King-
dom, Germany, the United States and Japan in Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled-For-
eign-Corporations, 66 TAXES INT'L, Apr. 1985, at 3, 10-11.
128. Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector-A Consultive Document, 22 TAXES
INT'L, Aug. 1981, at 10; Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector. supra note 127. The other
main measure against international tax avoidance in the United Kingdom was § 478 which
was designed to prevent residents from exporting assets and accumulating income overseas.
129. Whiteland-Smith, An Offshore Association, 115 TAX'N 414 (1985); Meyers, Tax
Havens, 133 NEW L.J. 963 (1983); Tax Havens-Beginning of the End?, 4 Bus. L. REV., Mar.
1983, at 33; Gammie, International Tax Avoidance-Progress at Last?, 110 TAX'N
90 (1982); Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector: A Response to the Public Comments, 35
TAXES INT'L, Sept. 1982, at 3; The Three Escape Clauses, id. at 9; The National United
Kingdom Tax Computation, id. at 12; Other Provisions and General Comments, id. at 14;
Tax Haven Companies, BRIT. TAX REV.. Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 7; Macquillan & Revill, Success
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procedures instead of complex income provisions like the United
States' Subpart F.' 30 The United Kindgom generally desired to
adopt general principles with some limited safe harbors with discre-
tion to apply to some taxpayers.
In its usual form, a United Kingdom double taxation treaty pro-
vides that the profits of an enterprise of the other contracting party
are not taxed unless there exists a permanent establishment in the
United Kingdom. The definitions articles of tax treaties usually
state that an enterprise is "of" a particular state if its business is
carried on by a resident in that state. However, the proposition pa-
per contained definitions which, if enacted in legislation, would
have conflicted with those in many treaties. Thus, the anti-tax ha-
ven legislation, had it adopted the proposition paper, would have
breached many treaties unless the United Kingdom followed its
normal practice of giving precedence to its treaties.
The British government's response to the conflicting public senti-
ment from the Consulative Document was a second document. The
second document, entitled "Company Residence," was the logical
companion to the first."3 ' Its purpose was to solve the problems in
the conflicts of the definitions in section 482 and, its proposed
amendments and British treaties. It opened with the proposition
that "it had become apparent that consideration needs to be given
to the concept of company residence for tax purposes." The second
document pointed out that there is no statutory definition of "resi-
dence," and the meaning of the term derives from case law which
"is mostly of some antiquity." The consquences of this legal uncer-
tainty and the conflict between case law and the reality of the com-
mercial world meant that established criteria had become artificial
with the passage of time and with technical innovations such as
rapid transportation and communications. Companies had been
able to arrange a residence for tax purposes which bore little rela-
tion to the base of the company's operations. Legislatively, the In-
land Revenue of the United Kingdom concluded that any replace-
ment of the prior law, section 482, would necessitate a recasting of
the terms on which a company was deemed to be a resident of the
United Kingdom for tax purposes.
The courts of the United Kingdom have acted in a manner simi-
130. U.K. International Tax Advisors Analyze the Inland Tax Revenue Paper Tax
Havens and the Corporate Sector, 22 TAXES INT'L Aug. 1981, at 10, 12.
131. The second document is also described in various articles listed supra notes 127-
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lar to U.S. courts by circumventing foreign secrecy laws. For exam-
ple, a London representative of a Bermuda bank was required to
comply with a demand by the Inland Revenue for information




The French too have battled with les parodic fiscals1 33 Article
70 of the French Finance law of 1980 instituted a system of taxa-
tion aimed at French corporate parents on certain profits of their
subsidiaries located in a privileged tax country. 34 This encroached
on the otherwise strong French principle of taxing company profits
on a territorial basis. A French taxpayer is now liable for the cor-
poration's tax in that he is subject to a tax on a pro-rata share of
the profits of a foreign subsidiary if he owns, directly or indirectly,
at least twenty-five percent of the subsidiary which is established in
a jurisdiction providing privileged tax status.13 5
Article 70 applies only to French enterprises subject to the
French corporate income tax either by way of law or election. Thus,
a French partnership or other French enterprise which is transpar-
ent for tax purposes, and which has not elected to be taxed as a
corporation, would not be subject to penalties. The same would be
true of French individual shareholders controlling a tax haven en-
tity. The French law defines tax havens as "jurisdictions imposing
no taxes or taxes at a level much lower than France does." France,
as do other countries, directly lists tax havens in its law. The anti-
tax haven provisions are to be applied to these jurisdictions. French
law lists jurisdictions not imposing income taxes, such as Andorra,
132. Clinch v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1973] 1 All E.R. 977.
133. Translated, this means "tax havens." French displeasure with tax havens dates
back to 1962 with the enactment of the Swiss-French tax treaty. See C. DOGGART, supra
note 1, at 72.
134. This was later codified as article 209B of the CODE GENERAL DES IMPOTS and
supplemented by a decree (No. 91-1173, Dec. 30, 1981). The French Code also contains
article 57 which gives tax authorities wide authority to reallocate income and expense when
it can be demonstrated that arm's length pricing standards have not been respected in inter-
national transactions between related parties. Article 57 applies essentially to French compa-
nies under foreign control or themselves in control of businesses conducted outside of French
territorial limits. It grants reallocation authority in a situation where there is direct or indi-
rect control between a French-based company and a foreign-based company and profits
which should have been taxable in France but which were transferred to the foreign-based
company.
135. As could have been expected, French multinational corporations which estab-
lished subsidiaries in privileged tax countries objected to this new law because of its penaliz-
ing aspect and also the lack of information concerning its applicability.
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Bermuda and Uruguay, separately from jurisdictions exempting
from tax certain types of foreign-source income, such as Lebanon,
Panama and Venezuela, and jurisdictions taxing at a level appreci-
ably lower than in France either in all cases or by reason of special
tax regimes available to local entities controlled by foreign persons.
Included in this last category are several British dependencies and
ex-dependencies such as Antigua, Barbados, Gibraltar, Jersey and
Luxembourg. Absent from the French list is the important tax ha-
ven of the Netherlands Antilles.186
3. Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany also legislatively lists Stever-
ause 5 7 countries in the Aussensteuerreformgesetz of 1972 (the
German Foreign Tax Act). Although the law does not specifically
describe the countries considered as tax havens, the German classi-
fications are very similar to the analysis of the various types of tax
havens seen in other nations.
The West German law against tax havens is similar to that of
the United States. 8' It is aimed at preventing companies from es-
tablishing in countries with lower tax rates than Germany for the
sole purpose of avoiding German taxes. 39 Detailed regulations
under this act were published in 1974. Germany's Foreign Tax Act
also extends German tax liability to German citizens who move out
of Germany into a tax haven country. If these citizens retain sub-
stantial economic ties with Germany, they remain subject to Ger-
man taxes on German-source income at progressive rates for ten
years after moving out of Germany.'4 0
4. Belgium
One of the aims of the 1973 Belgium tax law was to prevent
fraud and international tax evasion through anti-avoidance mea-
sures. Where payments are made by a Belgian taxpayer to a com-
136. Guillerm-Kirk, France, 42 TAXES INT'L, Apr. 1983, at 20. See also Kaplan &
Ault, International Developments-Another View, 8 J. CORP. TAX'N 68 (1981); Guillerm-
Kirk, The Development of the French Anti-Tax Haven Legislation, 19 TAXES INT'L. May
1981, at 1; Irish, supra note 23.
137. Translated, this means "tax haven."
138. For a history of Germany's attempts to deal with tax havens, see C. DOGGART.
supra note 1, at 79.
139. The German Aussensteuerreformgesetz is wider in scope than the United States
Subpart F since its coverage extends to individuals and certain foundations.
140. The courts have also played a role in attempting to limit the use of tax havens by
Germans. See INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 30, at 327-28.
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pany established in a country whose tax system is notably more
advantageous than that of Belgium, the taxpayer has the burden of
proving that the payments were incurred in genuine transactions
and that they do not exceed Belgium's normal limits. " "
5. Japan
Japan currently imposes a tax on the pro-rata share of the undis-
tributed income of specified foreign subsidiaries. This income must
be attributable to Japanese resident corporate shareholders owning,
directly or indirectly, ten percent of the total shares of the foreign
subsidiary. 142 Overall, Japan's prevention of tax havens can be re-
garded as minimal.
6. Canada
Canadian tax authorities, inspired by those in the United States,
have become increasingly critical of income earned through prop-
erty held by tax privileged "foreign business corporations." Section
48 of the Canadian Income Tax Act now provides that a resident of
Canada who departs from Canada is deemed to have disposed of
most of his property at its fair market value. As a result of this
recently enacted departure tax, a resident leaving Canada finds
himself subject to tax on many of his assets as though he had sold
them. Even worse, however, this "disposition" may not qualify for
foreign tax credit in the United States and some other countries.1 43
7. Australia
Australia's new Labor government promised to launch a cam-
paign against tax havens14 both by legislation and court action.14'
The attack has been primarily on tax haven islands in close proxim-
ity to Australia. Additionally, breaking through secrecy laws is a
major goal of the Australian government. Exchange control author-
ity from the Reserve Bank of Australia is required for almost all
transactions between residents and non-residents to curtail the im-
proper use of tax havens. To that end, residence for exchange con-
trol purposes is defined differently from residence for tax purposes.
141. See generally M. LANGER, supra note 5, at 112.
142. REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
143. M. LANG ER, supra note 5, at 112. See generally Ilersic, Tax Havens and Resi-
dence, 30 CANADIAN TAX. J. 52 (1982).
144. Gorr, Australia, 42 TAXES INT'L. Apr. 1983, at 17.
145. C. DOGGART, supra note 1, at 75; M. LANGER, supra note 5, at 110.
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The Reserve Bank of Australia, which administers the exchange
control provisions, is not permitted to give exchange authority
where one of the parties to the transaction is a resident of or lo-
cated in a scheduled tax haven unless the Commissioner of Taxa-
tion has first granted a Tax Clearance Certificate.
146
8. Regional Efforts
Groups of countries and various international organizations have
made efforts to prevent tax havens. For example,
OECD member nations, both through international tax avoid-
ance legislation and through exchange control rules, seek to mini-
mize the opportunity for the use of tax haven companies.
This developing attack on tax havens has gathered pace in the
last few years. High tax rates in developed nations have undoubt-
edly led to the increasing use of tax havens and it is perhaps a
measure of their success that in retaliation the rules restricting
their use have progressively been tightened. Recognition of the
tax planning uses of certain aspects of the tax legislation of other-
wise normal taxing nations has, in some instances, also led to an
attempt to restrict the use of these territories by international
companies.1
7
One such attempt was the Convention on Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters concluded by Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden in 1972, a multilateral convention dealing
with international tax evasion and avoidance. The United States,
the United Kingdom, France and West Germany presently are con-
sidering development of a multilateral auditing program. Various
spokesmen in the European Economic Community, the OECD and
146. Hamilton, Taxation of Foreign Investors in Australia, 11 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV.,
Jan. 1984, at 8, 12.
147. Browne, International Tax and Exchange Control Regulations in OECD Coun-
tries, II TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., July 1984, at 11, 12. See also INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOID-
ANCE, supra note 30. The United States' involvement in international efforts is rising:
The United States, through Treasury Department representatives, has taken a
lead role in work-in-process in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) which bears on the use and abuse of tax havens, in the Carib-
bean and elsewhere. Working parties . . . of the OECD have been studying tax
haven problems generally, and, more specifically, abuse of tax treaties with tax
havens. Reports on these subjects are now in preparation with substantial U.S. con-
tributions. The committee has also been doing extensive work on the exchange of
information under tax treaties which, while not specifically related to tax havens,
clearly bears on efforts to curb their use. Similar work on combatting tax haven
abuse has occurred in the Group of Four . . . and the Pacific Association of Tax
Administrators (Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States.)
TAX HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN, supra note 5, at 49.
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the United Nations constantly consider the problem of international
tax evasion and avoidance practices, and they may be of assistance
in the future.
The Fiscal Affairs Committee of the OECD recently met in Paris
and adopted a draft convention on tax evasion and avoidance. If
implemented, the treaty, which is a "joint venture" between the
OECD and the Council of Europe, will not affect existing bilateral
tax information sharing agreements. The adoption of a draft treaty
by the Fiscal Committee of the OECD does not commit any coun-
try to adoption of the treaty, but rather simply allows the signature
process to begin. " 8
V. ANALYSIS
The use of tax treaties can be an excellent mechanism to prevent
tax evasion through tax havens. The recent treaties that the United
States has proposed or ratified as well as the United States treaty
policy towards tax havens and the history of the treaties are impor-
tant means for surveying the use of tax treaties to prevent tax
havens.
A. The Use of Income Tax Treaties to Prevent Tax Havens
Notwithstanding a direct call to tax havens themselves for their
cooperation,' 9 the history of income tax treaties demonstrates their
importance to their present shortcomings in preventing tax haven
abuses.1 50 The exchange of information between taxing jurisdictions
to reduce international tax evasion and measures to avoid and to
prevent treaty shopping are paramount factors that must be in-
cluded in tax treaties to curtail future tax haven abuses.
15
1
148. TAX NOTES INT'L (July 23, 1986).
149. "Both United States and foreign persons are evading and avoiding tax laws by
using tax haven companies with which the United States has income tax treaties. It is obvi-
ous that this activity could not take place at current levels if the tax havens cooperated with
the United States." Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, supra note 12.
150. REPORT, supra note 4; Irish, supra note 23, at 501; Gordon, supra note Ii, at
797.
151. Another result from exchange of information provisions is the development of
cooperative audit programs to reduce international tax evasion and avoidance. See Irish,
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1. Exchange of Information
The Report concluded that "[e]xchange of information provisions
in the existing tax treaties with tax havens are simply inadequate
because they do not override local bank or commercial secrecy
laws. In any event, the United States does not have treaties with
most tax havens.'
1 52
Direct exchanges of information, which have been included in re-
cent treaties, must be provided for in all future income tax treaties.
This is the only sure way of circumventing bank or commercial se-
crecy laws which are essential characteristics of a tax haven opera-
tion. However, careful attention is required in drafting the provi-
sions to ensure their utility. There should be no technical difficulties
that could prevent the exchange of the information. This would re-
quire a clear description of the information that is sought as well as
provisions for overcoming any legal obstacles in obtaining the infor-
mation. Also, the United States' treaty networks must be expanded,
particularly to tax haven jurisdictions, to provide exchanges of
information.
The United States additionally is confronted with the problem of
obtaining information that is admissible in United States courts of
law. 153 Provisions addressing this issue can be found in existing
treaties, but their interpretation is often difficult and somewhat
skeptical. 54
The exchange of information concept may present itself in bilat-
eral forms other than an income tax treaty. The use of mutual as-
sistance treaties which usually require a criminal violation have
been highly successful. 55 The most significant U.S. mutual assis-
152. REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
153. See supra notes 65 & 118 and accompanying text.
154.
The treaties that exist have several limitations and are of limited usefulness in pro-
ducing information that is admissible in court. The informaton is often not in a form
that is admissible. Even if in admissible form, there is danger. Since U.S. and for-
eign laws differ, foreign authorities may use methods to produce the evidence which
complies with their law, but violates the U.S. Constitution. If so, and if the accused
has standing to object to use of the evidence, case law suggests that the evidence
would have to be suppressed. Suppression would result because the U.S. govern-
ment, by requesting foreign assistance, initiated the violation.
Spall, supra note 38, at 359.
155.
The mutual agreement treaty is potentially a more fruitful concept, but it covers
much more than tax issues and will usually be administered, in whole or in part, by
persons not in the normal path of confidential tax information. This will lead to




Belotsky: The Prevention of Tax Havens Via Income Tax Treaties
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tance treaty is its agreement with Switzerland. 1" Similar agree-
ments are also now in existance with the Netherlands," 7 Turkey
and Columbia and most recently with Canada. 158 Two major
problems confront exchange of information agreements: 1) they are
limited in authority; and 2) their enforcement poses a major prob-
lem. 16  These obstacles must be overcome.' 60
Recently, there has been pressure to create regional or interna-
tional mechanisms for exchanges of information among cooperating
nations to which tax havens would be persuaded to accede."' This
would be an excellent means of curbing international tax evasion or
avoidance. Also, an emphasis on exchange of information provisions
must be stressed in the extensive network of treaties being created
with developing countries." 2
2. Treaty Shopping
As has been seen in its definition and description, there exists an
overall heightened administrative and congressional concern with
and awareness of treaty shopping. Nonresidents may seek to reduce
their United States tax liability via tax havens in various ways. For
example, nonresidents may attempt to manipulate transfer prices to
shift United States profits to a tax haven subsidiary. They may also
try to escape United States taxes by routing transactions through a
country with which the United States does not have a tax treaty.
This is treaty shopping in its raw form.
Tax treaties are an important device in eliminating the problem
Rosenbloom, supra note 79, § 31.03[3].
156. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 109. It has been suggested that this treaty be revised to include an
asset forfeiture provision and extradition provisions. See R. BLUM. supra note 24, at 271.
The Internal Revenue Service has stated that the treaty has been useful, but complains that
it is limited to criminal matters. Spall, supra note 38, at 347.
158. See Comment, supra note 2, at 690. The treaty was concluded on February 6,
1985. See Zagaris & Kochinke, Developments in Mutual Assistance: U.S.-Canada Reach
New Agreement and Swiss Court Decision Sheds Light on the Operation of the Amended
Swiss Act, INT'L EXCHANGE OF TAX INFORMATION: RECENT DEV. (June 4, 1985).
159. See Comment, supra note 2, at 691.
160. Congress could empower the President to enter into bilateral executive agree-
ments with foreign jurisdictions for the exchange of tax information; however, it is arguable
whether I.R.C. § 6103(k)(4) (1982) would permit this.
161. See R. BLUM, supra note 24, at 278; Irish, supra note 23, at 482. See European
Economic Community, Council Directive of 19 December 1977 Concerning Mutual Assis-
tance by the Competent Authorities of the Member States in the Field of Direct Taxation;
German-French Memorandum on Tax Evasion/Avoidance on the International Level, 14
EUR. TAX'N 136 (1974).
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of treaty shopping. The Model Income Tax Conventions were
designed to limit significantly the third country use of treaties.
There is little incentive, however, for tax haven countries such as
the Netherlands Antilles to make concessions in a new treaty which
the United States would regard as meaningful. 113 Moreover, under
certain circumstances, a United States threat of a unilateral termi-
nation of a treaty is perceived by some tax haven states as an
empty threat. When the United States has a substantial interest in
preserving the treaty, there is little likelihood that the threat of a
complete termination would be carried through.
The most common way of curtailing treaty shopping in tax trea-
ties is by including an anti-holding company provision which disal-
lows reduced tax rates on dividends, interest and royalties if the
recipient corporation is not a resident.' " Such a provision must be
included in all future treaties. Treaty shopping has played a major
role in the enactment or reenactment of recent United States trea-
ties. The United States agreement to certain treaty shopping excep-
tions in the proposed treaty with the Netherlands Antilles' " is a
radical departure from a strong anti-treaty shopping stance and
should not become a practice or precedent.
3. Tax Treaty Abuse
A subject of international debate, and of particular concern to
the U.S., is tax treaty abuse.' 66 The actual abuse of tax treaties
varies significantly from treaty to treaty.1
6 7
The question of what constitutes abuse of tax treaties is even
more difficult to answer than the question of the abuse of the tax
law of the various jurisdictions. One reason is that most tax trea-
ties serve several purposes simultaneously, and these purposes
may conflict. Another reason is that there is usually little or no
official information about any policy the treaty partners may have
for preventing tax avoidance or "abuse" through the exploitation
163. See Tomsett, supra note 77, at 13.
164. See Irish, supra note 23.
165. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
166. Egger Discusses Tax Haven Problem Before House Subcommittee, supra note
23, 99947; Rosenbloom, supra note 77. Effective administration of tax treaties and their
anti-abuse provisions are limited because (1) full and willing cooperation of the treaty part-
ners' tax administration in the form of resources and expertise is necessary; (2) there must
exist meaningful exchanges of information; and (3) there must be a much greater commit-
ment of resources than are available. REPORT, supra note 4, at 163-65.
167. Chapoton Explains U.S. Tax Haven Treaty Policy, supra note 23.
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of tax treaties.' 68
Treaty abuse may be in the areas of limitation of benefits, ex-
change of information provisions, anti-holding company rules or
any specified article of the treaty. Treaty interpretation is also an
area for great abuse. The summary of treaty abuse by a leading
study can best explain the problem:
a) The question of abuse of tax treaties must be governed primar-
ily by their interpretation with the help of all means of interpreta-
tion available in the legal systems of the treaty partners unless
these are over-ruled by any special rules of interpretation embod-
ied in or arising from the tax treaty itself.
b) There is at present no general internationally accepted rule
dealing with criteria for tax-treaty abuse (for example similar or
analogous to criteria generally to be found in national rules of tax
law concerning abuse of tax law or substance over form).
c) Abuse of tax treaties may be countered, if a tax treaty permits
or at least does not expressly forbid, by rules in the national tax
law or one or both treaty partners about special techniques of in-
terpretation like abuse of tax law or substance over form. This
theoretical possibility does not seem to be of much practical im-
portance because of the serious difficulty of applying these rules.
d) The intent and purposes of the treaty legislators should be de-
cisive consideration in deciding questions of treaty abuse. An in-
tent to counter a certain kind of abuse should be embodied in
specific treaty articles exclusively designed for this purpose. There
should at least be clear and unmistakable statements in the offi-
cial documents explaining the treaty, like exchanges of notes, pre-
ambles or other documents such as parliamentary papers. Article
16 of the U.S. Model Treaty is one of the possible examples of
this "direct" legislative method. 16
The United States is always presented with the option of amend-
ing the Internal Revenue Code to prevent income treaty abuse for
the area involved. Nevertheless, a tax treaty, in order to prevent tax
havens, must take into account the possibility of its abuse and con-
tain significant provisions for correcting any such abuse.
B. Recent Treaty Developments
The true factor of the effectiveness of tax treaties as a prevention
device for the use of tax havens is actual treaty developments.
168. INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 30, at 313.
169. Id. at 330.
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These include the proposal or ratification of new treaties or recogni-
tion of old treaties. The United States has a large and growing net-
work of income tax treaties.170 Some are in various negotiation
stages of approval.' In light of the growing concern over tax
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Argentina has shown little interest in exchanging Instruments of
Ratification since the Senate gave advice and consent subject to
certain reservations.
Bangladesh appears to object to the United States' reservation
that the United States be given "most favored nation"
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many tax haven countries, including the treaty with the tax haven
of the British Virgin Islands, and renegotiated a new treaty with
Barbados."7 2 Also, immediately following publication of the Report,
the United States Senate began investigating various treaties. 173
1. Most Recent Treaties
In late 1985, the Senate ratified income tax treaties with Italy, 7,
Cyprus 75 and Barbados.17 The Senate Finance Committee further
approved treaties with Denmark and China.'7 In 1986, a treaty
with Bermuda was signed178and the China treaty was ratified. "'
The most significant development, however, has been the most re-
172.
TAX TREATIES TERMINATED
British Virgin Island Malawi*




Burundi* St. Vincent & the Grenadines*
Dominica* Seychelles*
Falkland Islands Sierra Leone
Gambia Zamabia
Grenada Zaire
*Denotes tax haven status.
See infra note 176 and accompanying text regarding the United States-Barbados treaty.
173. Within the first year after publication of the Report, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee scheduled at least fourteen pending treaties for consideration. Gordon,
supra note 1I, at 798.
174. Convention between the Government of the United States and the Government of
the Republic of Italy for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on In-
come and the Prevention of Fraud or Fiscal Evasion, Dec. 30, 1985, United States-Italy,
TAX TREATIES P-H 1 53,030.
175. Convention between the Government of the United States and the Government of
the Republic of Cyprus for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 30, 1985, United States-Cyprus, TAX
TREATIES P-H, 29,100.
176. Convention between the Government of Barbados and the Government of the
United States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Feb. 28, 1986, United States-Barbados, TAX TREATIES P-H, 20,100.
177. 9 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Aug. 1982, at 12.
178. United States Enters into Treaty with Bermuda on Taxation of Insurance and
Mutual Assistance in Tax Enforcement, TAX NOTES TODAY (TAX ANALYSTS), July 28,
1986.
179. By a vote of 96 to 1, the Senate July 24 [1986] ratified a tax treaty between
the U.S. and the People's Republic of China. Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., who has
long opposed the treaty, was the only dissenter. Helms had blocked ratification of
the treaty last December and was instrumental in the May 10 [1986] signing of a
protocol providing rules to prevent treaty shopping. The treaty provides for a 10
percent tax rate on income from dividends, interest and royalties paid to residents of
China on income earned in the U.S. The treaty also grants a 10 percent tax rate to
U.S. companies doing business in China.
32 TAX NOTES 306 (1986).
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cent negotiation and signing of the income tax treaty between the
United States and the important tax haven of the Netherlands An-
tilles. 180 The exact same treaty was also enacted with Aruba.'81
The Cyprus and Barbados treaties are of particular importance
because those countries are known as tax havens. The treaty history
of Barbados presents an interesting case example. In 1976, the gov-
ernment of Barbados enacted the Offshore Banking Act of 1979
after declaring its intention to develop as a tax haven. The stated
aims of the Act were to encourage the development of Barbados as
a responsible off-shore financial center, to provide incentives to in-
vestment in Barbados by way of tax reduction, exemptions and ben-
efits for off-shore banking carried on from within Barbados and to
enable citizens of Barbados to share in the ownership, management
and rewards of any business activities resulting therefrom.' 82
The United Kingdom quickly dealt with the Act by insisting that
the United Kingdom-Barbados Income Tax Treaty be revised to ex-
clude international business companies."' The United States had
difficulties ratifying its previously terminated treaty with Barbados.
In their review of the Barbados treaty, the Finance Committee and
the Ways and Means Committee warned of a potential loophole in
a provision designed to exempt Barbadian resident companies from
the United States accumulated earnings tax if the majority of con-
trolling stockholders were residents of Barbados. According to staff
documents, the reservation would "make it clear that if a United
States citizen holds a majority of the voting power or value of stock
in a Barbadian company the United States accumulated earnings
tax would apply."' " The problem was ironed out and the treaty
was ratified last year. 85
A proposed treaty between the United States and Bermuda may
also be a significant development in the battle against tax haven
abuse. This treaty would exempt Bermuda insurance enterprises
from United States income and excise taxes on their United States
180. Netherlands Antilles-U.S. Tax Treaty Signed August 8. 1986, TAX NOTES TO-
DAY (TAX ANALYSTS), Aug. !1, 1986.
181. TAX NOTES TODAY, (TAX ANALYSTS), Aug. 14, 1986.
182. Government to Develop Island as Tax Haven, 2 Co. LAW., Jan. 1981, at 42.
183. See explanation of art. XXIII United Kingdom-Barbados Income Tax Conven-
tion in Government to Develop Island as Tax Havens. supra note 182.
184. Senate Ratifies Three Treaties, SFC Approves Two Others and Ways and Means
Sees Problems with Proposed Treaties, 407 TAX TREATIES, Dec. 27, 1985.
185. On March 13 and 14, 1986, the Central Bank of Barbados held a seminar on the
United States-Barbados income tax treaty. For a complete listing of the tax documents that
were published as a result of this meeting, see 32 TAX NOTES 241 (1986).
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premium income if they do not have a permanent establishment in
the United States. In addition, the treaty would provide for mutual
assistance in tax matters, including the sharing of tax information
between the United States and Bermuda. 186 The provision for the
exchange of information is arguably an important step ahead; how-
ever, some believe that the treaty sets bad precedent by trading tax
exemption for mutual assistance in tax compliance matters.
187
2. Treaties with Tax Havens
Ultimately, the best way of preventing tax haven abuse is the
actual negotiation of tax treaties with tax haven countries which
would disallow any of the abusive practices. Currently, the United
States has treaties with only a few tax haven jurisdictions, yet lists
some twenty-nine official havens. 88 The new treaties with Barba-
dos, Bermuda and Cypress are excellent examples of the direction
that should be taken. The identification of abuses with some of the
United States' tax haven treaty partners are widely noted. 89
The oldest and probably the most effective income tax treaty
with a tax haven is that with Switzerland. 90 This treaty, which
specifically prevents abuses of Switzerland's status as a tax haven,
can also serve as an excellent model for future treaties.'
91
186. United States Enters into Treaty with Burmuda on Taxation of Insurance and
Mutual Assistance in Tax Enforcement, supra note 178.
187. New U.S.-Bermuda Pact Raises Questions About U.S. Tax Treaty Policy, 32
TAX NOTES 302 (1986).
188. See supra note 50.
189. The Report identified a large number of tax haven treaties, but stated that
large sums of money in the form of dividends, interest and royalties are flowing
through tax havens with which the United States has treaties. As much as $5 billion
in 1979 went to treaty jurisdictions, and more than $ 1.5 billion of this went to Swit-
zerland, the Netherlands, and the Netherlands Antilles.
Gordon, supra note 11, at 797.
The history of this situation is:
We have, at the present time tax treaties with several jurisdictions that are gener-
ally acknowledged to be tax havens. This results largely from historical accident;
during the 1950's our tax treaties with several European partners were extended to
a number of their overseas dependencies. Some of these have become tax havens
and have been exploiting their tax treaties with the United States. The most promi-
nent of these is the Netherlands Antilles.
As I indicated above, it is our firm policy to include limitation of benefits provi-
sions in any new tax treaty, in whatever form is necessary to deal with the potential
abuse in that particular bilateral relationship. Since the basic purpose of a tax
treaty is to eliminate double taxation, treaties with tax havens cannot be justified on
that basis.
Chapoton Authors Treasury Policy on Treaty Shopping, supra note 115, at 250.
190. See supra note 66. The United States also has an exchange of information agree-
ment with Switzerland. See supra note 67.
191. For example, article III of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
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One of the more recent U.S. tax treaties with a tax haven is the
one with Jamaica."' Immediately after publication of the Report,
the United States government entered protocol negotiations to the
then-pending income tax treaty. The United States insisted on
strong anti-treaty shopping articles and for provisions calling for
exchanges of information. The anti-treaty shopping article finally
ratified has been highly praised.19 3 Jamaica is also currently provid-
ing the United States with the information necessary to enforce the
tax laws.
These types of treaties are needed with all countries-especially
tax haven jurisdictions. The United States must concern itself with
establishing or renegotiating treaties with the problem tax havens.
3. Treaty Networks
One of the primary reasons that the United States is a victim of
so much tax haven abuse and treaty shopping is the use of treaty
networking.' The United States treaties with the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands are the main source of the networking. These
two countries and the United States extended their treaties to the
two important tax havens of the British Virgin Islands and the
Netherlands Antilles. These extensions provide a means for survey-
ing treaty networking and its effects.
a. British Virgin Islands. An income tax treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom was signed in 1945 and has
been amended by several supplementary protocols. A 1954 supple-
mentary convention extended the treaty to some twenty British col-
supra note 67, provides that
[w]here an enterprise of one of the contracting States is engaged in trade or busi-
ness in the territory of the other contracting State through a permanent establish-
ment situated therein, there shall be attributed to such permanent establishment the
industrial or commercial profits which it might be expected to derive if it were an
independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or
similar conditions and dealing at arm's length with the enterprise of which it is a
permanent establishment.
192. Convention between the Government of the United States and the Government of
Jamaica for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 29, 1981, United States-Jamaica, TAx TREATIES P-H, 1
55,102.
193. Gordon, supra note 11, at 798; Rosenbloom, supra note 79, § 31.05; Dole Com-
ments on Pending Tax Treaties, supra note 99, at 1007. The Jamaica treaty is also praised
for its limitations of benefits provision. Comment, supra note 84.
194. A treaty network is a situation where "[a] haven can be created when a treaty
exists between two powers (or once existed and remains in force only locally) and extends to
colonies or dependencies of one of the treaty partners in such a way that third parties may
enjoy the advantages of that treaty." R. BLUM, supra note 24, at 7. See also REPORT, supra
note 4, at 20.
1987]
47
Belotsky: The Prevention of Tax Havens Via Income Tax Treaties
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
onies. By its terms, the treaty could only be extended to territories
for whose international relations Britain was responsible and which
imposed income taxes substantially similar in character to those of
the United Kingdom.
The treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom
territories is now quite different from the present treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom since the older treaty
remains in force in the territories.1 95 For this reason, in an attempt
to end third country abuses, the United States terminated its treaty
with the important tax haven of the British Virgin Islands effective
January 1, 1983.11s Other treaties in the United Kingdom network
terminated effective January 1, 1984, include those with Anguilla,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher-
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The treaties with
Antiqua and Barbuda were also terminated effective August 26,
1983.
b. The Netherlands Antilles. Similarly, a treaty existed with
the most abusive tax haven of the Netherlands Antilles through the
United States-Netherland Income Tax Treaty. This treaty was
also subject to widespread abuse.197 The Netherlands perhaps has
195. For examples of some of the situations which apply under the treaty now in force
in these territories, see M. LANGER, supra note 5, at 174-75.
196.
On 1 July, 1982, the Treasury Department formally announced that the United
States had terminated the existing tax treaty with British Virgin Islands .... Under
the provisions of the treaty the cancellation will take effect on 1 January, 1983. At
that time, all income paid to persons in the British Virgin Islands will be subject to
the statutory withholding rates of 30 percent on fixed or determinable annual or
periodical income from sources in the United States ....
• . . The termination resulted after American negotiators had failed to convince
the British Virgin Islands officials to accept an anti-abuse clause (Article 16 of the
Model U.S. Income Tax Treaty) that Treasury insisted on adding to the existing
treaty. Article 16 prevents third party nationals from using holding companies in
the British Virgin Islands to avoid paying tax on U.S. earnings.
The existing treaty was an extension of the U.S. treaty with the United Kingdom
of 1945. In 1979, the United States and the British Virgin Islands had negotiated
an amended treaty which the Senate subsequently declined to ratify. The Senate
sent the treaty back to the administration for further changes at the request of the
Treasury Department. Tax specialists have indicated that the U.S. action on the
treaty is probably a sign that the Treasury intends to take a tough stand in the
future in determining tax treaty policy involving nations which they believe to be
channels for tax treaty abuse.
9 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Aug. 1982, at 12.
197.
Residents of third countries who are not themselves entitled to U.S. treaty benefits
are claiming, by routing their U.S. investments through an Antilles entity, U.S. tax
benefits provided under that treaty. Because of a relatively low and flexible tax in
the Netherlands Antilles, and because no taxes are levied under Antilles law on
income payments to nonresidents of the Antilles, a substantial reduction of U.S. tax
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the broadest system of income tax treaties with agreements with
most industrial nations and many developing nations.
The first income tax treaty between the United States and the
Netherlands was signed and ratified in 1948. It originally applied
only to the Netherlands, but article XXVII provided a method by
which it could be extended to the Netherlands Antilles. In 1955, a
protocol officially extended the treaty to the Netherlands Antilles.
The treaty and protocol allowed many abuses and many attempts
to change the convention ensued. 188 The latest negotiations began
in 1982.199 The Netherlands Antilles asserted that it wanted a new
treaty with the United States that would retain its withholding tax
on interest paid through subsidiaries. The recent history of the ne-
gotiations was long and complex and some thought that no perma-
nent resolution was in sight.20
On August 8, 1986, however, the United States signed an income
tax treaty with the Netherlands Antilles201 which now awaits ratifi-
liability flows through to the third-country investor. This treaty has often been re-
ferred to as "a one-way tax treaty with the world." For this reason, and to obtain
better exchanges of the information, we are renegotiating the treaty.
Chapoton Explains U.S. Tax Haven Treaty Policy, supra note 23, 9946.
198. Key provisions of the Netherlands Antilles treaty, supra note 109, which affect
the tax haven operations include:
Income of whatever nature derived from U.S. real property is taxable only in the
United States [Article V]. The same rule applies to interest from mortgages secured
by real property.
Article VII reduces to 15 percent the rate of U.S. tax on dividends from a U.S.
corporation by a Netherlands Antilles corporation which is not engaged in U.S. bus-
iness through a permanent establishment. A further reduction to 5 percent is pro-
vided for under some circumstances.
Interest derived from U.S. sources by a Netherlands Antilles corporation not en-
gaged in U.S. business through a permanent establishment is ordinarily exempt
from a U.S. tax [Article VIII]. However, the exemption does not apply to interest
paid by a U.S. corporation to a parent Netherlands Antilles corporation which con-
trols more than 50 percent of the voting power in the paying U.S. corporation. Nor
does it apply to mortgage interest.
Royalties derived from U.S. sources by a Netherlands Antilles corporation not
engaged in a U.S. business through a permanent establishment are exempt from
U.S. tax [Article IX].... A Netherlands Antilles corporation deriving rentals from
U.S. real property may elect for any taxable year to be subject to U.S. tax on such
rental income on a net income basis [Article X].
Dividends and interest paid by a Netherlands Antilles corporation are exempt
from U.S. tax unless the recipient is a U.S. citizen, U.S. resident or U.S. corpora-
tion [Aricle XII].
M. LANGER, supra note 5, at 195-96.
199. Comments by spectators flourished. See, e.g., A Treaty that May Sink Tax
Havens, supra note 5, at 140; Crackdown on Tax Havens, J. Com., Sept. 7, 1982, at 4A, col.
1.
200. See 9 TAX PLAN. INT'L REV., Mar. 1982, at 16 and 9 TAX PLANNING INT'L REV.,
Aug. 1982, at 12.
201. Convention between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Re-
spect of the Netherlands Antilles and the Government of the United States of America for
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cation in both countries. The treaty generally subscribes to the
United States 1981 Model Draft. It covers the United States fed-
eral income tax and certain federal excise taxes. It also covers the
Netherlands Antilles income, wages and profit taxes and surtaxes.
The treaty provides for maximum tax rates, at source, on dividends
of fifteen percent, reduced to five percent for dividends paid to com-
panies owning at least ten percent of the voting stock of the com-
pany paying the dividends. Interest and royalties will be generally
subject to a maximum rate of tax, at source, of five percent. The
treaty also contains provisions concerning the taxation of business
profits, personal service income, capital gains and other forms of
income, as well as provisions relating to the administration of the
treaty and the taxes to which it applies.
Whether this major breakthrough in the treaty with the Nether-
lands Antilles will gain ratification is questionable. The most con-
troversial and significant factor of this treaty is article 16 which
deals with treaty shopping, limiting third country use to specific
activities. One exception to article 16 involves international mutual
funds. The other exception to the treaty shopping provision applies
to qualified real estate companies. Under article 10 of the proposed
treaty, qualified real estate companies would receive a waiver for
the second withholding tax on dividends. In addition, under article
24, qualified real-estate companies would be eligible to make a sub-
section (i) election under Internal Revenue Code section 897. An
"(i) election" allows a foreign corporation with U.S. real estate
holdings to elect to be treated as a domestic corporation and, if
under a U.S. treaty obligation, to receive nondiscriminatory treat-
ment with respect to that interest. The treaty also contains an im-
portant updated exchange of information provision to assist in tax
enforcement.
The major concern on the part of the Netherlands Antilles is the
recently enacted tax reform in the United States. 2 If any legisla-
tion is enacted that would modify the treaty, negotiations would be
reopened to provide for the new United States taxing measures.
The United States even admits that the treaty's final negotiation
occurred at a bad time when tax reform was pending. °
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, signed August 8, 1986, TAX NOTES TODAY (TAX ANALYSTS), Aug. 11,
1986.
202. Netherlands Antilles-U.S. Tax Treaty Diplomatic Notes of Exchange, TAX
NOTES TODAY (TAX ANALYSTS), Aug. 11, 1986.
203. Treasury Announces Signing of New Income Tax Treaty with the Netherlands
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Whether the treaty if ratified in its present form will be a major
impact on the United States' treatment of treaty shopping and tax
havens remains to be seen.
4. Treaty Shopping Stance
Although extremely necessary, some believe that strong anti-
treaty shopping provisions have not been a priority in more recent
treaty negotiations. 4 The proposed treaties with China and the
Netherlands Antilles are foremost examples of the failure to pro-
vide a strong anti-treaty shopping clause. In fact, this was probably
the reason that the Chinese treaty was not ratified.
The proposed treaty with China contained a limited anti-treaty
shopping provision which was of concern to the Ways and Means
Committee. Because this provision was less strict than the provision
contained in most of the recent treaties enacted by the United
States, and less strict than the provision in the Treasury's model
income tax treaty, the Committee was concerned that other coun-
tries negotiating treaties with the U.S. would demand the inclusion
of the less strict provision. Also, abuses could occur since the treaty
does not specify whether it will cover Hong Kong when China re-
sumes sovereignty over it in 1997. If Hong Kong is covered, there
could be serious potential for treaty shopping. The treaty should
state that it will not apply to Hong Kong, or other provisions should
be made.20 6 The final U.S.-China protocol to the treaty contains a
Antilles, TAX NOTES TODAY (TAX ANALYSTS), Aug. 11, 1986.
204. In recent treaties, the Senate Foreign Relations Panel disregarded advice offered
by the House Panel concerning anti-treaty shopping measures. Senate Ratifies Three Trea-
ties, SFC Approves Two Others and Ways and Means Sees Problems with Proposed Trea-
ties, supra note 184, at 1.
205. Id. at 3; Patrick, supra note 93, at 5. Congressional leaders have expressed their
views on this as follows:
We recognize that the U.S. model provision is only one of several approaches that
the Treasury Department considers satisfactory to prevent treaty shopping abuses
and that the U.S. negotiators may be able to avoid making other treaty concessions
in a particular treaty negotiation by declining to insist on greater anti-treaty shop-
ping protection than appears necessary at the time of the negotiation. . . . [W]e
believe that the Treasury Department's agreement to include such a limited anti-
treaty shopping provision in this treaty could weaken its ability to negotiate compre-
hensive anti-treaty shopping provisions in future treaties. Other countries with lim-
ited treaty shopping potential at the time of the treaty negotiation will be able to
point to the Chinese treaty and, particularly if they are developing countries, de-
mand equal treatment. The danger here is that treaty shopping potential can de-
velop, as it has in some past cases, after treaty ratification.
Apart from the possible percential effect of the Chinese anti-treaty shopping pro-
vision, we have some concern about the potential for development of treaty shopping
abuses in China itself. Changes in Chinese law and admirtistrative practice with
respect to foreign investors have been occurring at a rapid pace in recent years and
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strong anti-shopping provision similar to that enacted in the treaty
with Denmark in 1984.06
The recent income tax treaty protocols with Denmark, France
and Italy, as well as the revised protocol to the Chinese treaty, indi-
cate that the United States is changing its traditional policy to-
wards treaty shopping. In signing those protocols, the U.S. has
raised the permitted percentage of third country resident ownership
of taxable income. This is an example of how the United States is
permitting treaty shopping with limitations. 07 Also, recent treaties
with Australia and New Zealand contain modified versions of anti-
treaty shopping provisions.20 8 These clauses are less strict than
those used in treaties with tax haven jurisdictions.
The signed treaty with the Netherlands Antilles and its specific
exceptions to the treaty shopping provision is a radical departure
from current policies and is not in the best interest of the U.S. tax
haven policy. However, final comment should be reserved until the
protocols are established and the treaty is actually ratified by both
countries.
The recent United States attitude to lessening treaty shopping
reflected in its treaty with the Netherlands Antilles does not mean
it is still not committed to strong policies. The British Virgin Is-
lands treaty negotiation is an example of the United States remain-
ing opposed to treaty shopping. 09 Treaty shopping has also recently
could continue to do so. The proposed treaty limits the U.S. withholding tax on
dividends paid to any portfolio Chinese investing entities to 10 percent, the lowest
rate of a U.S. treaty, matched only by the treaty with Romania.
Rostenkowski and Duncan Express Ways and Means View on Pending Treaties, 29 TAX
NOTES 789, 792 (1985).
206. 31 TAX NOTES 817 (1986).
207. Oliva, supra note 105, at 322-24.
208. See New Income Tax Treaty with Australia Ratified by the Senate & New In-
come Tax Treaty with New Zealand Ratified by the Senate, INT'L TAX ALERT (RIA), Sept.
1983, at 7.
209. "Our policy of limiting treaty shopping has been supported by the tax-writing
committees of Congress and by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the charimen
of both the the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees." Chapoton Ex-
plains U.S. Tax Haven Treaty Policy, supra note 23, 9946.
Commentators agree:
One area of visible and effective anti-tax haven activity concerns treaty shopping
or the unwelcome exploitation by third parties of bilateral conventions for the avoid-
ance of double taxation. Most treaties recently negotiated or renegotiated between
high-tax and low-tax countries have contained clauses preventing use of bilateral
treaties by third country residents (USA/British Virgin Island, USA/Cypress,
USA/Malta, UK/Netherlands, Canada/Barbados). Even under existing treaties,
U.S. authorities in particular have disallowed treaty withholding tax reductions
where the ultimate beneficiary was not resident in either of the contracting coun-
tries. It happened recently in the context of the United States-Netherlands treaty.
This attitude, which is likely to be adopted by other high-tax countries, casts further
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been approached administratively by the issuance of two revenue
rulings which may force jurisdictions such as the Netherland Antil-
lies into serious treaty negotiations. 210 The United States must con-
tinue to promote a strong anti-treaty shopping stance.
C. United States Tax Haven Treaty Policy
The Report stated that many of the treaty problems regarding
tax havens are caused by the failure of the U.S. government to act
expeditiously when problems develop.211 The government has now
started to act and is beginning to subscribe to a policy that will
combat the problem. 2  The current efforts do not escape criti-
cism. 213 The United States' policy sometimes subscribes to a work-
ing hypothesis that the history of the use of treaties establishes
boundaries of acceptable tax treaty policy.21'
1. Policy Options
The Report suggested seven options for the United States tax ha-
ven treaty policy,215 and commentators have also taken notice.216
doubts on the future of artificial holding companies.
C. DOGGERT, supra note I, at 83 (footnote omitted).
210. See supra note 117; Revenue Ruling 84-152: The Beginning of the End for
Treaty Shoppers, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 170 (1985).
211. Gordon, supra note 11, at 797.
212. Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and John E.
Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy), appeared before Congress to
discuss the problems caused by offshore tax havens and tax treaty countries as well as the
Internal Revenue Service's effort to deal with these problems. Commerce, Consumer and
Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, Apr. 13,
1983. They also discussed ways in which the U.S. tax treaties with tax haven countries are
used to avoid and evade taxes and explained U.S. treaty policy. See Chapoton Explains U.S.
Tax Haven Treaty Policy, supra note 23; Chapoton Authors Treasury Policy on Treaty
Shopping, supra note 115; Egger Discusses Tax Haven Problems Before House Subcommit-
tee, supra note 23.
213. See, e.g., Comment, Tax Treaties International, 14 INT'L LAW. 508 (1980).
214. Rosenbloom, supra note 79, § 31.04.
The hypothesis frequently proves to be incorrect. Views on treaty provisions can
change as Administrations and the composition of the Senate change. Moreover,
because tax treaties are not a subject that is constantly before the Congress, fresh
discoveries of old issues are not uncommon .... Generally, a change of view is not




1. To deal directly with United States tax treaties with tax havens, terminate the
existing income tax treaties with the Netherlands Antilles and the United Kingdom
extension and consider terminating income tax treaties with other tax havens, with
possible renegotiation.
2. To prevent future abuse, be selective in negotiating income tax treaties with
countries with which the United States does not have a significant trade or invest-
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The official U.S. policy as presented to Congress is not to enter into
new treaties which permit, renegotiate or terminate (as appropri-
ate) existing treaties so as to grant unwarranted benefits to resi-
dents of third countries. 17 The United States policy indicates that
the limitation of benefits in income tax treaties has several objec-
tives. 18 However, it might evolve that the U.S. could enter into a
ment relationship, and do not enter into full scale income tax treaties with known
tax havens. As an alternative, selectively enter into limited treaties with tax havens
that would include a nondiscrimination provision and a competent authority mecha-
nism and would contain an exchange of information provision overriding bank se-
crecy laws and practices.
3. To ensure that information necessary to administer the tax laws is available,
and to insure that information necessary to prosecute those who do not comply with
those laws is available, insist upon a strong exchange of information provision in
United States income tax treaties that would override foreign bank secrecy laws and
practices.
4. To deal with changes in local laws and practices of treaty partners, conduct
periodic reviews of treaties to determine whether they are being abused and whether
they are serving the function for which they were initially negotiated.
5. To provide access to information to be used in criminal prosecutions, vigorously
pursue mutual assistance treaties with the more important tax havens.
6. To encourage abusive tax havens to enter into exchange of information agree-
ments with the United States, consideration may have to be given to adopting mea-
sures to discouraging United States business from investing through tax havens that
do not give information, such as increasing taxes on payments to those tax havens.
7. To limit the potential for abuse of treaties with tax havens, and to limit the
incentive for treaty partners to adopt tax haven practices, incorporate strong provi-
sions to limit the use of treaties residents of a treaty country.
REPORT, supra note 4, at 12-13. See also discussion, id. at 170-75; MANUAL FOR THE NEGO-
TIATION OF BILATERAL TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
U.N. Pub. ST/ESA/94, 66-73 (1979).
216. Rosenbloom, supra note 79, § 31.05, suggests three major strands to the United
States tax treaty program in general:
(1) Renegotiation of existing treaties;
(2) Expansion of tax treaties to developing countries; and
(3) The evaluation and change of treaties that serve primarily to benefit investments by third
country residents in the United States.
Aland, supra note 10, at 1021, 1023-24, also states a series of options.
217. See articles cited supra note 212.
218.
First, curtailment of "treaty shopping" .....
Second, expansion and improvement of the U.S. tax treaty network. If residents
of these [third] countries can enjoy U.S. treaty benefits by the simple and inexpen-
sive expedient of establishing an entity in an appropriate U.S. treaty partner juris-
diction, their countries of residence have little incentive to enter into [treaties] with
the United States. Since such treaties would reduce foreign taxes on U.S. taxpayers,
the result is higher taxes abroad for U.S. businesses. The same issue arises with
respect to existing treaty partners. ...
Third, adherence to the letter and spirit of the law. Use of tax treaties by third-
country residents violates the coherence of the Internal Revenue Code. . . . If any
foreign investor can avoid ... tax by interposing a treaty-protected entity, then that
treaty has, in effect, replaced U.S. internal law. Such a process erodes confidence in
the integrity of the U.S. tax system. If Congress wishes unilaterally to repeal or
modify the present statutory tax, that should be done explicitly, by both houses of
Congress, and not by improper use of a tax treaty.
[Vol. 17
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treaty with a tax haven if, in addition to typical "tax haven" busi-
ness, substantial real economic relation exist between the U.S. and
that country. 19
The diverging policies regarding treaty shopping have already
been explored.2 Information secrecy problems are also a policy
concern regarding the abuse of tax treaties. Accessibility, or the
lack thereof, to information is a problem; not so much one of sub-
stantive tax law, but of getting the information, as well as using
that information effectively. The secrecy provisions of offshore tax
havens create a veil which is often difficult to penetrate.
22 1
The United States tax policy is decidedly against tax havens. It
must, however, be pointed out that other factors come into play as
indicated by the economic exception noted above. The Report listed
the following as considerations with regard to the United States tax
treaty policy objectives:
(1) Maintaining the competitive position of the United States
business investing abroad or exporting;
(2) Maintaining tax equity as between investments in the United
States and investments abroad;
(3) The need to provide fair rules for taxing foreign investments;
(4) Administrative efficiency;
(5) Foreign policy considerations; [and]
(6) Promotion of investment in the U.S. 2
The United States must continue to strive to limit benefits, pre-
vent treaty shopping and obtain fiscal information. This will ulti-
mately end tax haven abuses.
2. Caribbean Basin Initiative
One of the most significant developments regarding the current
U.S. tax haven policy has been the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Al-
though it is not a treaty process or mechanism, it is nevertheless
important. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act or "Car-
ibbean Basin Initiative," was enacted in 1983 and became effective
on January 1, 1984. It requires that the Secretary of the United
States Treasury
Chapoton Explains U.S. Tax Haven Treaty Policy, supra note 23, 9946.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
221. Egger Discusses Tax Haven Problems before House Subcommittee, supra note
23, 1 9947.
222. REPORT, supra note 4, at 42-43.
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(1) Indicate the level of use of Caribbean Basin tax havens to
evade or avoid Federal taxes, and the effect on Federal revenues
of such use;
(2) Provide available information on any relationship between
such use and other non-tax criminal use; and,
(3) Describe current anti-tax haven enforcement activities of the
Treasury Department.
223
The legislation provides limited tax concessions and trade benefits
to eligible countries which agree to exchange tax information with
the United States.
In 1984, the Department of the Treasury released a report enti-
tled "Tax Havens in the Caribbean Basin" in response to the re-
quirement in the Act that it advise the House Ways and Means
Committee and Senate Finance Committee on the use of Caribbean
tax havens . 2 4 The report did not suggest solutions to the tax haven
problem, but instead attempted to estimate revenue losses and de-
scribe criminal enforcement activities. The exchange of information
was the basic purpose of the legislation, but early findings were cur-
sory and skeptical in this regard. 25 There were, however, some in-
223. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, supra note 12, at 97 Stat. 397. For
various legislative comments, see Sharp & Steele, The Caribbean Basin Exchange of Infor-
mation Draft Agreement-A Technical Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 949 (1985); Note, Anti-
Tax Haven Activities of the United States, 10 INT'L TAX J. 273 (1984); and Its Tax Havens
vs. Tourists in the Caribbean, Bus. WK., Aug. 22, 1983, at 35, 39.
224. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12. The conclusion stated:
This report is intended primarily to update the material provided in the Gordon
report. The data collected and presented in this report show that the use of tax
havens, which was already very significant at the time the Gordon report was pre-
pared, has continued to rise sharply. It is very difficult to measure the illegal use of
tax havens because of the nature of the transactions and because of the difficulty of
obtaining information from most tax havens. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to
assume that a great deal of activity designed to violate the tax and other laws of the
United States takes place in the Caribbean Basin tax havens.
Id. at 51-52.
225. For example, "Requirements for exchange of information agreements" findings
stated:
The principal U.S. tax benefit provided to countries of the Caribbean Basin under
the CBI legislation is the allowance to U.S. taxpayers of deductions for ordinary
and necessary expenses of attending business conventions held in CBI beneficiary
countries without a showing that it is as reasonable to hold the convention in that
country as in the "North American Area." To qualify for this benefit, in addition to
meeting the standards for CBI beneficiary countries generally, a country must enter
into an agreement with the United States to exchange tax information. Thus, coun-
tries of the region will have to be willing to cooperate with the IRS in tax adminis-
tration and enforcement in order to benefit from the convention tax deduction provi-
sions of the CBI legislation. This is of particular importance with respect to the tax
haven jurisdictions of the Caribbean Basin. In addition to the substantive benefits to
U.S. tax compliance efforts which would flow from such agreements, this provision
of the statute sends a clear message to other countries of the seriousness with which
the United States views the problems of tax avoidance and evasion through transac-
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teresting observations regarding the U.S. treaty policy with respect
to Caribbean tax havens.2
26
Final reports on the legislation's effect, if any, on the prevention
of tax havens are still incomplete.22 However, the legislation does
demonstrate concern in the area and is another beginning for the
U.S. anti-tax haven policy.
tions involving tax havens.
Id. at 48 (footnotes ommitted).
226.
While the United States would not presently enter into a new treaty relationship
with a tax haven, unless the potential for abuse was significantly proscribed and
substantial real economic relations exist between the United States and that coun-
try, it has or has had tax treaties with several Caribbean jurisdictions that are gen-
erally acknowledged to be tax havens. This results largely from historical accident;
during the 1950's, U.S. tax treaties with several European partners were extended
to a number of overseas dependencies of the European countries. Some of these
Caribbean jurisdictions have become tax havens and have been exploiting their tax
treaties with the United States.
There are several options available in dealing with existing tax haven treaties.
The United States can renegotiate these treaties to eliminate the potential for abuse;
it can terminate the treaties and not replace them; or it can terminate the treaties
and seek to negotiate a new treaty on satisfactory terms. The Treasury has taken, or
is prepared to take, each of these approaches, as appropriate, in individual cases.
In early 1981, a new treaty was signed with the British Virgin Islands (BVI) to
replace the extension of the U.S.-U.K. treaty to the BVI, which treaty was becom-
ing increasingly subject to abuse. On reflection, the present Administration deter-
mined that the new treaty, while reducing the opportunity for abuse by third-coun-
try residents, remained susceptible to a continuing and not insignificant level of
potential abuse, and should, therefore, not enter into force without amendment. The
ensuing efforts to renegotiate that treaty to insert a sufficiently restrictive limitation
on benefits provision were not successful. The negotiations were suspended and the
existing treaty which had remained in force, was terminated as of January 1, 1983.
On July 1, 1983, the Treasury announced that notices of termination had been
sent to a number of jurisdictions to which the U.K. and Belgian treaties had been
extended, including nine U.K. extension treaties in the Caribbean Basin area. These
terminations will be effective as of January 1, 1984 .... In those cases where it is
judged appropriate to do so, the United States is prepared to enter into negotiations
with these jurisdictions on new treaties which would, at the same time, more ade-
quately reflect those countries economic relationships with the United States, and
insure against abuse of the treaty.
Yet another approach has been taken with the Netherlands Antilles. Negotiations
have been ongoing for several years on a new treaty which would deal with most
forms of third-country use of the treaty. The present treaty has remained in force
while the negotiations have proceeded. It is the intention of the Treasury Depart-
ment that the United States will have no tax treaties in force with Caribbean tax
havens that are subject to abuse.
To assure both that the benefits of U.S. tax treaties are received only by persons
properly entitled to them, and that the IRS has the information necessary to enforce
U.S. tax laws with respect to any transactions which may take place within the
jurisdiction of a tax haven treaty partner, any such treaties as may exist will have
comprehensive exchange of information provisions.
Id. at 45-47 (footnotes omitted).
227. Commentators have noted that "[tihe trade provisions seem to be working, but
the tax provisions are not." M. Langer, Treasury Issues Draft CBI Exchange-of-Informa-
tion Agreement, 58 TAXES INT'L 69 (1984).
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CONCLUSION
The use of tax havens is a growing international problem which
can result in either illegal tax evasion or legal tax avoidance. There
are many forms of tax haven use and abuse. The history of interna-
tional tax avoidance and tax havens is vast and possible attempts to
eliminate the problem of tax evasion have been encompassing.
Income tax treaties also have a long history and have been uti-
lized by nations of the world for various functions including the
prevention of fiscal evasion. Income tax treaties can be an ex-
tremely effective mechanism or tool in the prevention of tax havens
if used properly. Such use includes stringent anti-treaty shopping
measures and exchange of information provisions between coun-
tries. The primary goal of the U.S. today should be to renegotiate
existing treaties to include these mechanisms as well as to provide
for them in future treaties as a direct way to curtail tax haven
abuse. This is of particular importance in regard to treaties with
tax haven jurisdictions.
There are alternative methods to prevent tax haven abuse and
tax evasion. Recently, the courts have been a helpful solution, espe-
cially in the production of tax evasion information. Broadening leg-
islation has been the major method used by foreign countries in
attempting to resolve the tax haven abuse problem and could be-
come a workable method in the United States.
Recent treaties of the United States have revealed an effort to
eliminate tax haven abuses. The treaties enacted in the last few
years exemplify this. There has been, however, an unfortunate
weakening of the U.S. stance toward treaty shopping. The United
States with its extensive network of income tax treaties has made
some advances with regard to the treaties with tax haven jurisdic-
tions, specifically the negotiation of the treaty with Barbados and
termination of the treaty with the British Virgin Islands. Still, the
recent proposed treaty with the Netherlands Antilles has been most
detrimental to the United State's policy.
The United States has developed a stringent tax treaty policy
which includes anti-treaty shopping and exchange of information
goals. Future U.S. efforts must include strict compliance with this
policy and possible multilateral attempts to deal with tax haven
abuse and international tax evasion. As noted in the beginning of
this Article, all tax haven use is not undesirable. "The use of tax
havens is a part of [tax] planning [but it] should, however, be kept
in proportion ... [as] the promoter of a tax haven company should
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not forget that it is better to pay tax on profits than to incur
losses. ' '228 In order to reinforce this view, tax evasion and avoidance
must be controlled. If comprehensive, income tax treaties can be
vital in the prevention of tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance
through the use of tax havens.
228. E. CHAMBOST, supra note 5, at 192.
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